

Policy Regulation of Precarious Work Schedules and Bottom-Up Enforcement: An Evaluation of State Reporting Pay Policies

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Ryan Finnigan^{1,2} & Savannah Hunter²

¹ *University of California, Berkeley*

² *University of California, Davis*

Abstract

Precarious work schedules, including last-minute cuts to workers' shifts, undermine well-being for millions of workers and their families in the United States. Drawing on dispute resolution theories and prior research on complaint-driven enforcement of labor regulations, this study evaluates whether and how labor regulations can moderate this precarity. In eight states and Washington, D.C., "reporting pay" policies require employers to pay workers for some portion of their shift if they report to work but the employer ends their shift much earlier than scheduled. To evaluate these policies, we fielded an original survey of hourly workers measuring self-reported and actual policy coverage, the frequency of shift cuts, and receipt of reporting pay following shift cuts. We find evidence for only partial compliance with reporting pay policies, at best. We next examine the role of workers' information about these policies in the enforcement process. Extremely few workers covered by reporting pay policies accurately identified the presence of the state policy. However, a survey experiment demonstrates that providing information about reporting pay policies significantly increases recommendations that a hypothetical worker should push for compensation for a shift cut, either with the manager directly or through external enforcement by the state. We conclude with discussion of bottom-up enforcement for labor regulations and possibilities for improvement.

About the Authors

Ryan Finnigan is a Senior Research Associate at the Terner Center for Housing Innovation at the University of California, Berkeley, and an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Davis. In addition to research on unstable work schedules, Ryan studies poverty, homelessness, and policy.

Savannah Hunter is a Ph.D. Candidate in Sociology at the University of California, Davis, and a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellow. Savannah's work examines unstable work scheduling, occupational health and safety, and labor regulation and policy.

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INTRODUCTION

Unstable and unpredictable schedules commonly reduce and destabilize incomes (Finnigan 2018; Golden 2016; Morduch and Schneider 2017), complicate caregiving responsibilities (Alvarez et al. 2019; Henly and Lambert 2014), and undermine well-being (Schneider and Harknett 2019). Many employers ostensibly vary schedules to minimize labor costs in the face of volatile demand (Appelbaum, Bernhardt, and Murnane 2003; Halpin 2015; Lambert et al. 2019). In retail and food service, unpredictable and unstable work schedules are the norm (Schneider and Harknett 2019), and managers frequently send home employees without pay when business is slow (Halpin 2015; Luce, Hammad, and Sipe 2014).

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) does not regulate schedule stability or predictability nationally, but “reporting pay” policies in eight states and Washington, D.C. require employers to pay workers for some portion of their shift if they report to work but their shift is cut short (Alexander, Haley-Lock, and Ruan 2015).¹ For example, employees in California who report to work but have their shifts cut short by their employers must be paid for half of the scheduled shifts (minimum two hours and maximum four hours). Similar policies are part of recently enacted “fair workweek” ordinances in San Francisco, New York City, Philadelphia, Seattle, and Oregon. Reporting pay partially protects workers from lost earnings due to last-minute hours cuts. Reporting pay may also disincentivize employers from deliberately overscheduling workers then sending them home if demand is low.

Like most labor regulations, reporting pay policies rely on “bottom-up enforcement” requiring workers to recognize their rights and advocate for themselves, either to their employer or to the state (Alexander and Prasad 2014; Weil and Pyles 2005). However, many workers are unaware of detailed labor regulations or how to file complaints, and many justifiably fear retaliation from employers (Alexander and Prasad 2014; Bernhardt, Spiller, and Polson 2013). Limited prior evidence suggests reporting pay policies are not widely enforced. For example, a survey of retail workers in New York City found that almost three-quarters of workers sent home early did not receive the required reporting pay (Luce, Fujita, and Sipe 2012). Compliance with more recent “fair workweek” ordinances has also been mixed (Haley-Lock et al. 2019; Ben-Ishai, Lopez Marchena, and Ziliak Michel 2016; Scott, King, and Reddy 2017).

To evaluate compliance with reporting pay policies and their enforcement processes, we surveyed hourly workers in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. The survey measured

whether workers had shifts cut short and if they received reporting pay. Guided by the literature on labor dispute resolution (Albiston, Edelman, and Milligan 2014; Alexander and Prasad 2014; Dowding et al. 2000; Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat 1980; Hirschman 1970), we next assessed workers' awareness of and willingness to recommend enforcing reporting pay policies following a hypothetical violation. Finally, we discuss implications for improving labor policy enforcement.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Precarious Work Schedules

Precarious work schedules—work hours that are irregular and unpredictable in number and timing—are increasingly common for workers in the United States, particularly for low-wage workers (Finnigan 2018; LaBriola and Schneider 2019; Lambert, Henly, and Kim 2019; Schneider and Harknett 2019). Managers commonly cut short workers' scheduled shifts when demand is lower than expected, particularly in service industries (Halpin 2015; Luce, Hammad, and Sipe 2014). Even independent of demand, front-line managers use variable schedules to reduce labor costs, frequently a key metric by which managers are evaluated (Appelbaum, Bernhardt, and Murnane 2003; Lambert et al. 2019; Loustaunau et al. 2020). Precarious work schedules undermine workers' economic security (Finnigan 2018; Morduch and Schneider 2017; Schneider and Harknett 2019). Even net of earnings, precarious schedules correlate with lower happiness, sleep quality, work-life balance, and mental well-being (Alvarez et al. 2019; Henly and Lambert 2014; Lambert, Henly, and Kim 2019; Schneider and Harknett 2019; Scott, King, and Reddy 2017; Shaddock-Hernández et al. 2018).

This study examines a facet of precarious schedules targeted by state policies—work shifts cut short by employers after employees report to work, hereafter “shift cuts” or “cut shifts.” Cut shifts can substantially reduce hourly workers' total earnings and increase earnings instability. For example, retail workers experiencing one six-hour shift cut relative to their average 30-hour workweek lose 20 percent of their weekly earnings.² Even one such shift cut every four weeks reduces monthly earnings by five percent, equivalent to cutting the median retail workers' hourly wage (\$11.69/hour in 2018) by 58 cents/hour. This earnings instability can lead to food insecurity and missed housing payments for the many workers living paycheck-to-paycheck (Morduch and Schneider 2017; Schneider and Harknett 2019; Scott, King, and Reddy

2017; Shaddock-Hernández et al. 2018).

We are not aware of national estimates for the prevalence of shift cuts, but studies repeatedly show last-minute schedule changes are common among retail and food service workers (Halpin 2015; Lambert, Henly, and Kim 2019; Luce, Hammad, and Sipe 2014; Schneider and Harknett 2019). In a 2016 survey of Oregon workers, 41 percent reported being sent home early from a shift (Scott, King, and Reddy 2017). Among Los Angeles retail workers in 2017, 16 percent had an entire shift cut less than 24 hours before the scheduled start time (Shaddock-Hernández et al. 2018). About half of retail and fast-food workers said their manager sometimes or often reduced or changed their hours without their consent in New York (Luce, Fujita, and Sipe 2012) and Chicago (Dickson, Bruno, and Twarog 2015).

State Reporting Pay Policies

Reporting pay policies require employers to pay employees for some portion of a scheduled work shift if the employer shortens or eliminates that shift after the employee has reported to work (Alexander, Haley-Lock, and Ruan 2015). For example, California requires employers to pay workers for half of the scheduled shift (no fewer than two hours and no more than four) at their regular rate of pay. Similar policies are part of recent “fair workweek” ordinances in San Francisco, Seattle, New York, Philadelphia, and Oregon, alongside several other provisions for schedule predictability. Union contracts and employers’ own policies sometimes include reporting pay provisions, but it is not clear how often (Alexander, Haley-Lock, and Ruan 2015). Table 1 summarizes reporting pay policies by state.

Reporting pay policies compensate workers for the expense of reporting to work only to find work shortened or unavailable, limiting the resulting shortfall in earnings. Consider a minimum wage (\$14.00/hour in 2021) employee in California. California’s reporting pay policy reduces the earnings shortfall from being sent home at the beginning of an eight-hour shift from \$112 to \$56. Reporting pay policies may also disincentivize employers’ precarious scheduling practices (Alexander, Haley-Lock, and Ruan 2015). Similar to on-call scheduling, employers may deliberately schedule an excessive number of workers for a given shift in case demand is higher than anticipated (Halpin 2015; Lambert et al. 2019). This strategy costs employers little if they can send unneeded employees home early without pay. Reporting pay policies create a monetary cost for this practice, potentially making it less attractive.

Table 1. Description of Reporting Pay Policies by State, 2019

State	Coverage	Number of Hours Guaranteed	Pay Rate
California	Covers most workers. Some notable exceptions: Public-sector employees; Administrative, professional, executive, or managerial workers; Family members of employees; Horse-racing employees; Commercial fishing boats; Actors; Personal attendants or babysitters; Railway workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement; Businesses with fewer than 5 employees.	minimum 2 and maximum 4	Regular rate
Connecticut	Covers retail and restaurant workers except: Scheduled shift was less than 4 hours; Regular pay is at least double minimum wage	Minimum 2 (restaurants) or 4 (retail)	Minimum wage (restaurants) or regular rate (retail)
District of Columbia	Covers all workers except: scheduled shift was less than 4 hours	Minimum 4	Minimum wage
Massachusetts	Covers all workers except: non-profits; scheduled shift was 3 hours or less	Minimum 3	Minimum wage
New Hampshire	Covers all workers except: county and municipal employees; ski and snowboard instructors	Minimum 2	Regular rate
New Jersey	Covers all workers except: employer has made available the minimum agreed upon hours	Minimum 1	Regular rate
New York	Covers all workers except: building services; farm workers; non-profits with exemption; employer has made available the minimum agreed upon hours	Minimum 3 (hospitality and food service) or 4 (other) hours or the scheduled shift, whichever is less; maximum 8 (hospitality and food service)	Minimum wage
Oregon	Covers retail, hospitality, and food service workers with 500 or more employees	Shift length	Half of regular rate
Rhode Island	Covers all workers	Minimum 3 and maximum 4 (Sundays only)	Regular rate

Notes: Sources include Alexander, Haley-Lock, and Ruan (2015), Ben-Ishai (2014), and primary examination of state statutes and regulations. Most states exclude coverage of shifts cut due to "Acts of God" or following employer attempts to contact the employee before reporting to work. Our research suggests most state policies were passed in the 1940s to 1950s, but some passage dates are inconclusive and coverage has evolved over time. Table reflects policies as of 2019.

The first research questions for this study ask whether evidence supports these potential effects when comparing workers who are and are not covered by reporting pay policies.

Question 1: Do workers covered by state reporting pay policies receive reporting pay for cut shifts more commonly than workers who are not covered?

Question 2: Do workers covered by state reporting pay policies experience cut shifts less commonly than workers who are not covered?

Reporting pay policies' effectiveness may be limited in several ways, however. First, the required amount of pay may be insufficient to change employers' behavior meaningfully. For example, New Jersey requires only one hour of reporting pay. New York mandates reporting pay at the minimum wage instead of workers' regular rate for hours not worked. Second, reporting pay policies include various exclusions and exceptions. All policies cover only workers paid hourly and not exempt from overtime. The policies exclude unforeseen circumstances like Acts of God or public utility failures. Three states (California, Connecticut, and New Hampshire) exempt employers who *attempt* to notify employees about shift cuts before they report to work. Policies also typically do not cover workers who "volunteer" to leave work early (Loustanaou et al. 2020). Such rules exclude many last-minute shift cuts and create ambiguity or disagreement between employers and employees on the circumstances requiring reporting pay (Alexander, Haley-Lock, and Ruan 2015). Reporting pay policies may have little detectable association with shift cuts and compensation as a result. Third, like the minimum wage and other wage laws, reporting pay policies rely on bottom-up enforcement. The following section describes fundamental limitations to bottom-up enforcement that hamper regulation of labor violations.

Dispute Resolution and Bottom-Up Enforcement

Labor law enforcement in the U.S. typically relies on "bottom-up enforcement"—reliance on "workers themselves identifying violations of their rights and making claims to enforce them" (Alexander and Prasad 2014, 1071; see also Fine and Gordon 2010; Weil and Pyles 2005). When employees covered by reporting pay policies are sent home from work without pay, they must first recognize this violation of the reporting pay policy. Workers must then approach their

employers directly and/or file a complaint with the appropriate government agency. Workers must also believe that any benefit from the complaint will outweigh the risk of employer retaliation.

Dispute resolution theories guide our analysis of bottom-up enforcement for reporting pay policies (Albiston, Edelman, and Milligan 2014; Alexander and Prasad 2014; Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat 1980; Miller and Sarat 1980). Dispute resolution is a social process—a worker first perceives some experience as injurious, transforms this recognition into a grievance assigning fault for the injury, and finally communicates this grievance to the person(s) or organization(s) responsible. These three steps are called naming, blaming, and claiming the issue (Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat 1980). Dispute resolution theories often portray the process as a pyramid with unrecognized injuries at the base, followed by sequentially smaller tiers representing the stages of the dispute resolution process: naming, blaming, claiming, dispute, and resolution of the dispute (Alexander and Prasad 2014; Miller and Sarat 1980).

Limited recognition of labor violations is one of the largest barriers to bottom-up enforcement. Workers may not recognize when they experience labor violations, and managers with inadequate knowledge may unknowingly violate labor policies. In the 2008 Unregulated Work Survey (UWS), over two-thirds of low-wage workers experienced a wage violation in the previous year (Bernhardt, Spiller, and Polson 2013), including being paid below the minimum wage, not being paid for off-the-clock or overtime work, not receiving required meal or rest breaks, or a workers' compensation violation. However, only one-third of respondents self-reported a violation in the previous year (Alexander and Prasad 2014). This reporting gap is largely attributable to limited legal knowledge among workers. About 60 percent of UWS respondents did not know the local minimum wage or rules for overtime pay (Alexander and Prasad 2014). Our third research question asks:

Question 3: To what degree are workers who are covered by reporting pay policies aware of these policies?

We predict awareness of reporting pay policies may be even lower than awareness of other labor regulations, like the minimum wage. Methods for informing workers about reporting pay policies may be especially limited. For example, California's Department of Labor Standards

Enforcement describes “reporting-time pay” on the seventh page of an eleven-page wage ordinance document that employers post in the workplace. As argued by Alexander and Prasad (2014), workers’ limited knowledge about the minimum wage and other labor rights suggests these postings are not effective.

Even when workers recognize labor violations, they must choose whether and how to address them. Our survey measures how commonly workers say they make complaints after identifying reporting pay violations. However, such data only observe actions among people who are covered by reporting pay policies, experience violations, and recognize the violations. The data cannot speak to whether workers *would* pursue enforcement *if they were made aware* of reporting pay policies. We further assess whether providing information about reporting pay policies shapes workers’ responses using a survey experiment about a hypothetical reporting pay violation—a hypothetical retail worker in California is sent home without pay at the beginning of her shift. At random, we provide information about California’s reporting pay policy. If most workers recommend pursuing enforcement when informed about reporting pay policies, information may be a solution for increasing the policies’ effectiveness. However, further supports may be needed if most workers remain unwilling to recommend enforcement even with policy information. Our fourth research question asks:

Question 4: To what extent does informing workers about reporting pay policies affect their responses to hypothetical reporting pay violations?

Though the dispute resolution pyramid may imply a linear path from labor violations to formal grievances, workers’ actual responses vary widely (Albiston, Edelman, and Milligan 2014; Alexander and Prasad 2014). Hirschman’s (1970) theory that “exit” and “voice” are possible responses to disputes has been applied to situations like labor violations (Dowding et al. 2000). “Voice” broadly refers to efforts to change the situation or at least identify a problem, while “exit” refers to leaving a job if the worker does not wish to or cannot resolve the issue. Many factors influence workers’ decisions between “voice” and “exit,” including their belief that “voice” will be effective and their perception of viable alternative jobs. Following Hirschman (1970) and subsequent empirical work (Alexander and Prasad 2014; Dowding et al. 2000; Hoffmann 2006), we examine four types of possible responses to reporting pay violations:

external enforcement (formal complaints to the state), internal enforcement (complaints to the employer), accommodation (compromises falling short of enforcement), and exit.

Workers' pursuit of enforcement following workplace violations is not the norm, especially not through formal complaints to the state. Of workers who experienced a labor violation and recognized it as such in the UWS, the majority chose not to pursue the issue. Of those who did, almost all workers complained directly to employers (96 percent) rather than to the state or local government (Alexander and Prasad 2014). Other literature similarly demonstrates that legal mobilization of disputes is rare (Miller and Sarat 1980; Weil and Pyles 2005). Instead, workers and employers commonly resolve disputes internally (Albiston et al. 2014; Alvarez et al. 2019).

Attempts to resolve disputes directly with managers can fall short of compliance with labor policies, particularly when workers feel powerless relative to their employers. In Alvarez et al.'s (2019, 194) study of work scheduling, workers' attempts to keep employers from "breaking labor laws without being held responsible" required constant "self-advocacy" that was not viable in the long run. Workers often felt forced to compromise with their employers when self-advocating, like accepting unwanted timing in exchange for the desired number of work hours. We use "accommodation" to refer to workers' responses that fall short of employer compliance with reporting pay policies.

Workers who are unable to resolve or tolerate labor violations may quit and look for a new job, or "exit." Exit can be costly. Many workers feel unable to quit because they cannot afford income losses or interruptions (Alvarez et al. 2019). Looking for another job may also be a futile strategy for avoiding labor violations in occupations and industries where such violations are commonplace (Bernhardt, Spiller, and Polson 2013; Fugiel and Lambert 2019; Schneider and Harknett 2019).

Information about reporting pay policies may influence whether workers recommend responding to violations with external enforcement, internal enforcement, accommodation, or exit. This information could both allow workers to recognize violations and empower them to push for their enforcement. Complaints in the UWS were more likely among workers who were knowledgeable about labor laws and the process for making formal complaints to the government (Alexander and Prasad 2014), even though almost all complaints were made to

employers. We thus expect information provision to substantially increase recommendations for enforcement and decrease recommendations for accommodation and exit.

We also examine how workers' responses to reporting pay violations may be mixed or progress following repeated violations. Our experiment allows workers to recommend multiple responses to the hypothetical violation, which could include combinations of enforcement, accommodation, and exit (Alvarez et al. 2019; Hirschman 1970). The survey next presents a repeated hypothetical violation, examining whether workers' recommendations escalate from internal to external enforcement when violations persist. Weil and Pyles (2005) analysis of complaints under the FLSA suggests it takes multiple violations to trigger a complaint by workers. Alternatively, workers could switch from recommending enforcement to exit if they believe enforcement is ineffective. We focus on whether information provision enables/empowers workers to progress toward recommendations for enforcement and away from accommodation or exit.

DATA & METHODS

We designed an original online survey for currently employed workers in the United States, primarily those paid hourly, administered by Qualtrics in 2019. The survey was short (median completion time was 7.6 minutes) and asked questions about: job characteristics, work schedules, experiences with cut shifts and wage theft, awareness of local reporting pay and minimum wage policies, hypothetical scenarios involving cut shifts and underpayment, and limited background information. The survey included respondents from all 50 states and the District of Columbia, roughly proportional to population. In total, 1,633 workers (1,458 paid hourly) completed the survey with valid responses. The final analytic sample includes 1,233 hourly workers with information on all key variables.

Relative to nationally representative data on hourly workers, the sample is skewed toward females and whites. Similar to other online surveys (e.g., Schneider and Harknett 2019), we apply sample weights based on age, sex, race, and union membership calculated from the Current Population Survey (CPS). These weights cannot adjust for unobserved factors selecting respondents into the sample, however. Appendix A describes in-depth the survey design, questions, response rates, sample composition, and weighting. As shown in Table A2 in

Appendix A, most key worker characteristics in our sample are very similar to the 2018 CPS after weighting.

Reporting Pay Coverage

We used several sources to identify reporting pay coverage. We first consulted existing reviews of state reporting pay policies (Alexander, Haley-Lock, and Ruan 2015; Ben-Ishai, Hammad, and Warden 2014). Next, we examined all fifty state department of labor websites in 2018 and searched three legal databases for reporting pay policies not documented in prior reviews, including Oregon’s recent fair workweek ordinances. From each state’s labor code, we coded the covered industries and exceptions, the minimum and maximum number of hours guaranteed, and the amount of pay guaranteed, summarized in Table 1.³

Three survey questions measure individual coverage by reporting pay policies. The first question asks the state in which the respondent works for their “main job” (the job where they work the most hours or earn the most money). The second and third questions ask respondents’ occupation and industry for their main job. We individually coded these responses to identify covered workers. Our analytic sample includes 163 covered workers and 1,070 uncovered workers. Table A3 in Appendix A presents analytic sample sizes by state.

Cut Shifts and Receipt of Reporting Pay

To measure cut shifts, the survey asked, “In your main job, have you ever reported to work and been sent home because business was slow or for some other reason decided by your employer?” Responses included never, occasionally, and often. Among those who report shift cuts, the survey measured receipt of reporting pay with the question, “Have you received any compensation when you were sent home because business was slow or for some other reason decided by your employer?” Responses included never, sometimes, and usually or always.

Awareness of Reporting Pay Policies

To measure respondents’ awareness of reporting pay policies, the survey asked, “Is your main job in a place with policies for ‘reporting’ or ‘predictability’ pay, which require compensation for being sent home early from a work shift?” Respondents could answer yes, no, or “don’t know or not sure.” For those answering “yes,” the survey asked, “What authority

requires compensation for being sent home early from a work shift?” Options included the state/local government, a union agreement, an employer’s own policy, a text box for other responses, and “don’t know or not sure.” Using these questions, we construct a categorical variable for self-reported coverage by reporting pay policies: covered by a government policy; covered by some other kind of policy (employer, union agreement, other); not sure if covered; not covered. We assess policy awareness by comparing these responses to actual coverage by a state reporting pay policy.

If respondents said they experienced shift cuts and are covered by a reporting policy, the next question asked whether workers had “ever contacted that authority to be compensated when you were sent home from work because business was slow or some other reason decided by the employer?” Answers included “yes” and “no.” We use this binary variable to measure reporting-pay claims by workers.

Survey Experiment

A survey experiment based on a vignette assessed how informing workers about reporting pay policies might affect responses to violations. The survey asked respondents to recommend responses for a hypothetical worker in the following scenario:

Consider the following hypothetical situation. Julia works full-time at a large retail clothing store in California. Julia is regularly scheduled to work from 10am to 6pm on Mondays through Fridays. Julia arrives to work on Wednesday morning but is sent home without pay because business is slow. *California’s law for reporting-time pay entitles Julia to pay for half of this scheduled shift if she reports to work.* What would you advise Julia to do? You may select multiple options.

The italicized sentence (not italicized in the actual survey) about the reporting pay policy was randomly included for half the sample (the treatment group). Enforcement recommendations included “inform the manager she’s due four hours of pay” (internal) and “report the issue to the state/local government” (external). Recommendations for accommodation included: “ask the manager for a replacement shift,” “try to switch shifts with another employee,” and “do nothing.” Exit included “look for another job.” The response options also included “don’t know or not sure” and a text box for other responses.

The survey subsequently asked, “Suppose Julia is sent home at the start of her shift again. What would you advise Julia to do? You may select multiple options.” Response choices were the same. This follow-up question assesses whether willingness to complain differs by whether a cut shift seems to be a potentially isolated or common experience.

Analytic Strategy

The first stage of the analyses assesses compliance with state reporting pay policies. Multinomial logistic regressions predict receipt of reporting pay and experiences of cut shifts using a binary variable for reporting pay coverage and control variables (described below). Ordinal logistic regressions are more parsimonious but violate the proportional odds assumption. We present the results with predicted probabilities of the outcomes by reporting pay coverage. We predict receipt of reporting pay only among respondents who have experienced shift cuts (N = 434). All other main analyses use the full analytic sample (N = 1,233).

Control variables include worker and state characteristics that may confound associations between reporting pay coverage and the outcomes. Worker characteristics include age (years), sex (female = 1, male = 0), race/ethnicity (White, Black/African American, Latino/a, Asian/Pacific Islander, American Indian or Alaskan Native, multiracial or other), marital status (married = 1, not married = 0), number of children in the household, nativity (non-US born = 1, US born = 0), a binary variable for service workers (retail, food service, hospitality, cleaning services), union membership (yes = 1, no = 0), public employment (works for federal, state, or local government = 1), logged annual earnings (natural log of the midpoints for nine earnings categories), the number of usual hours worked per week, and job tenure (less than six months, six months to one year, one to three years, three to six years, more than six years). State-level controls include the state minimum wage (or federal if higher) and unemployment rate in 2018.

The second stage of the analyses assesses policy enforcement. To examine awareness, a multinomial logistic regression predicts self-reported policy coverage with actual policy coverage and all control variables. We present results with predicted probabilities of the self-reported categories by actual reporting pay coverage. Next, binary logistic regressions predict each of the potential responses in the survey experiment with treatment/control status. We present the results with the predicted probabilities of each response for the treatment and control groups in the first and second vignettes.

As expected with random assignment, no control variables statistically significantly predict treatment status. We include these predictors to assess how recommendations may vary by workers' characteristics. We also test for heterogeneous treatment effects by actual reporting pay coverage and dimensions of worker power: service employment, sex, race/ethnicity, and union membership.

Supplemental Data

We complement the observational analyses with additional tests and data. During data collection, we introduced follow-up questions about shift cuts and receipt of reporting pay. If respondents said they “sometimes” or “often” experienced shift cuts, we also asked how many times they experienced shift cuts *in the last month*. If respondents said they “sometimes” or “often” experienced shift cuts and they “sometimes” or “usually/often” received reporting pay, we also asked if they received reporting pay *following their most recent shift cut*. Appendix C presents analyses using these more detailed outcome measures (N = 695).

We sought administrative data on complaints or citations for reporting pay violations from state labor departments. In 2019, we examined each state's labor department website and analyzed publicly available data (Massachusetts since 2015), text mined individual wage citations (New Hampshire since 2014), and submitted data requests by email and public records requests (with responses from Rhode Island and California).

Finally, the first author attended a training session on California labor regulations in December 2018. A deputy labor commissioner facilitated this voluntary, six-hour training session to inform employers about a wide range of labor regulations. Content from this session could shed light on how effectively employers are informed about reporting pay policies.

Potential Limitations

Our original data are uniquely suited for this study but also have important potential limitations. We briefly enumerate these limitations here and discuss them at length in Appendix A. First, the Qualtrics online survey panel is not based on a nationally representative sampling frame. Despite weighting on observables, selection on unobserved characteristics is unknown. Even still, prominent studies have used non-probability surveys to fill gaps in traditional labor force surveys (e.g., Schneider and Harknett 2019) with adjustments for observables.

Second, the survey weights cannot adjust for unobserved selection and may not fully adjust for the sample's overrepresentation of some workers, notably women and white workers. However, results from the survey experiment are still internally valid despite any biases in its representativeness, similar to prior survey experiments using Qualtrics or other online samples (e.g., Pedulla 2016; Quadlin 2018).

Third, our cross-sectional data document *prima facie* evidence for general compliance with reporting pay policies, but they cannot rigorously identify the policies' causal effects. Unfortunately, there are no data before and after the policies' implementation to yield stronger inference.

Fourth, responses may differ in the vignette experiment versus real situations. Workers may be more likely to recommend enforcement to the hypothetical worker than to pursue it on their own, given that they do not bear the potential costs (i.e., time, effort, bureaucratic navigation, risk of retaliation). Workers' responses may also be influenced by the hypothetical worker's ("Julia") perceived gender or race/ethnicity. Recommendations to "look for another job" may be underestimated because the sample only includes employed workers.

RESULTS

Table 2 presents weighted descriptive statistics. Shift cuts are common, with 37% of all respondents (N = 1,233) experiencing them at least sometimes. Among workers who report cut shifts (N = 434), 55% say they never receive compensation and only 23% say they usually/always receive compensation.⁴

Reporting pay policies cover 14% of hourly workers in our sample. Covered and uncovered workers notably differ. The minimum wage is \$2.70/hour higher for covered workers than uncovered workers, on average. Covered workers are disproportionately Latino/a, Asian/Pacific Islander, and non-U.S. born, mainly due to reporting pay policies being more common in diverse states like California and New York. Covered workers also work about two fewer hours/week and earn \$2,260 less per year than uncovered workers, on average, partly due to higher rates of service employment.

Table 2. Percentages or means and (standard deviations) for key variables.

	Total	Reporting Pay Covered	Not Reporting Pay Covered	p-value for Difference by Reporting Pay Coverage
<i>Shift Cuts</i>				
Never	63%	64%	63%	
Sometimes	32%	34%	32%	
Often	5%	2%	5%	†
<i>Receive Reporting Pay</i>				
Never	55%	35%	59%	*
Sometimes	21%	38%	19%	*
Often	23%	27%	23%	
<i>State Characteristics</i>				
Reporting Pay Covered	14%	100%	0%	<i>by definition</i>
Minimum Wage	8.78 (1.71)	11.08 (1.26)	8.40 (1.46)	***
Unemployment Rate	3.82 (0.57)	3.93 (0.42)	3.80 (0.60)	
<i>Worker Characteristics</i>				
Age	40.14 (13.68)	39.83 (13.09)	40.20 (13.78)	
Female	49%	51%	49%	
Married	37%	31%	38%	
Children in HH	38%	38%	38%	
White	57%	39%	60%	***
Black	14%	7%	15%	*
Latino/a	21%	42%	18%	***
Asian/Pacific Islander	2%	7%	2%	**
American Indian/Alaskan Native	1%	0%	1%	
Other or Multiracial	4%	5%	4%	
Immigrant	9%	18%	7%	*
Service Worker	28%	33%	27%	
Union Member	11%	13%	10%	
Public Sector	10%	7%	10%	
Annual Earnings (\$1,000s)	45.52 (39.58)	44.08 (34.15)	45.76 (35.82)	
Usual Hours/Week	38.07 (10.98)	36.16 (10.98)	38.38 (10.96)	*
Job Tenure < 1 Year	23%	29%	22%	
N	1,233	163	1,070	

Notes: Estimates use sample weights. Receipt of reporting pay is among those who report experience shift cuts (total N = 434; reporting pay covered N = 54; not reporting pay covered = 380). Statistical significance for differences by reporting pay coverage are from binary logistic regressions for categorical variables or OLS regressions for continuous variables. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10

Compliance with Reporting Pay Policies

First, we assess policy compliance by comparing receipt of reporting pay between covered and uncovered workers (question 1). This analysis only includes workers who have experienced shift cuts (N = 434). Figure 1 presents the predicted probabilities of reporting pay receipt by policy coverage from the regression with all controls, which holds constant observable compositional differences. The legend presents the statistical significance of the differences by policy coverage for each outcome category. Table B1 in Appendix B presents the regression coefficients.




Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of receiving reporting pay among those with cut shifts by reporting pay (RP) policy coverage (N = 434).

Notes: Predicted probabilities are from a multinomial logistic regression with all control variables, described in the text. *** $p < 0.001$ for the predicted difference between those with and without reporting pay coverage.

There is some evidence that employers comply with reporting pay policies. The probability of receiving compensation at least sometimes is much greater for covered (76%) than uncovered (40%) workers ($p < 0.001$). This difference is due to a higher probability for covered workers saying they “sometimes” receive compensation ($p < 0.001$). The probability of usually/always receiving compensation is not statistically distinguishable between covered and uncovered workers ($p = 0.940$).⁵

Second, we test for evidence that reporting pay policies disincentivize cut shifts (question 2) among the entire analytic sample (N = 1,233). Figure 2 presents the predicted probabilities of the categories for self-reported shift cuts from the regression with all controls (full results in

Table B2 in Appendix B). We find minimal evidence that cut shifts are less common for covered workers compared to uncovered workers. The predicted probabilities for occasionally experiencing shift cuts are very similar and not statistically distinguishable ($p = 0.939$). Covered workers are less likely than uncovered workers to say they often experience shift cuts ($p < 0.001$), but the difference is substantively small (three percentage points).⁶




Figure 2. Predicted probabilities of cut shifts by reporting pay (RP) policy coverage (N = 1,233). Notes: Predicted probabilities are from a multinomial logistic regression with all control variables, described in the text. * $p < 0.05$ for the predicted difference between those with and without reporting pay policy coverage.

We also examined whether these patterns differed by the number of hours or amount of pay required. Among workers experiencing shift cuts (N = 434), we replaced the binary variable for reporting pay coverage with dummy variables for the minimum number of hours required (one, two, three, four, vs zero). Reporting pay receipt is statistically significantly more likely for covered than uncovered workers but not dependent on the minimum number of hours required. Next, we replaced the binary reporting pay coverage variable with a linear variable for the required amount of reporting pay required (the minimum number of hours guaranteed times the corresponding hourly wage rate described in Table 1). The probability of receiving compensation is significantly greater for workers with higher amounts of required reporting pay. Among all workers (N = 1,233), neither the number of required hours nor the amount of pay significantly predict shift cuts.⁷

Appendix C presents results for reporting pay received *after the most recent shift cut* (N =

264) and shift cuts *in the last month* (N = 695). Responses to these more detailed survey questions are very consistent with the questions analyzed above—workers reporting shift cuts and reporting pay in the main questions also report them in these more specific questions. A Regressions predicting reporting pay receipt after the most recent shift cut yield mixed results, suggesting compliance may be even weaker than shown in Figure 1. We find no strong evidence that shift cuts in the last month are less common for covered than uncovered workers, consistent with Figure 2.

In sum, the results provide some evidence that workers covered by reporting pay policies are compensated for cut shifts more commonly than uncovered workers, but only “sometimes.” Only about one-quarter of covered workers say they usually/always receive compensation for shift cuts, similar to the fraction among uncovered workers. The many exceptions to these policies may account for the association with “sometimes” but not “usually/always” receiving reporting pay. For example, managers often ask workers to volunteer to leave work early (Loustaunau et al. 2020), making them ineligible for reporting pay. Workers may also have had their shifts cut after the minimum number of compensated work hours. This level of compliance is not especially low compared to other labor policies, but other policies also suffer from weak enforcement (Bernhardt, Spiller, and Polson 2013). Finally, the results do not strongly support the hypothesized disincentive for cutting shifts of covered workers.⁸

Awareness of Reporting Pay Policies

Workers covered by reporting pay policies must first be aware of these policies to pursue enforcement in the event of non-compliance by employers. Figure 3 presents patterns of self-identified reporting pay coverage by actual coverage (N = 1,225).

Explicit awareness of state reporting pay policies appears very low (question 3), likely contributing to the lack of strong compliance documented above. Only four percent of covered workers say they are covered by a state/local government policy, compared with five percent of uncovered workers ($p = 0.609$). However, a larger fraction of covered workers than uncovered workers selected “don’t know or not sure” (28% vs 16%, $p = 0.046$), potentially suggesting some latent awareness of reporting pay policies for covered workers. These respondents may be able to obtain the relevant policy information in the event of a suspected violation.

Fewer covered workers (48%) than uncovered workers (63%) say they are not covered by

any policy ($p = 0.033$). Awareness of reporting pay policies is lower than awareness of the minimum wage. About one-third of workers correctly identified which of five categories included their state’s minimum wage.⁹




Figure 3. Awareness of reporting pay (RP) policy by reporting pay (RP) policy coverage (N = 1,225).

Notes: Percentages are estimated with sample weights. The analysis excludes eight observations with missing values for self-reported reporting pay coverage. * $p < 0.05$ for the difference between those with and without reporting pay policy coverage from a bivariate logistic regression.

Low awareness of reporting pay policies among employers may also contribute to non-compliance, supported by two supplementary results. First, our sample included 116 supervisors in states with reporting pay policies (including salaried workers from initial data collection that are excluded from the analytic sample). Only 17% of supervisors correctly identified the presence of a state reporting pay policy. Second, the informational session on California employment law included minimal information on the state’s reporting pay policy. The six-hour session focused heavily on rest/meal breaks and payment following employee termination, but discussed reporting pay for only two minutes. Notably, these sessions are voluntary—a small and non-random group of employers opt into these sessions and receive this limited information on reporting pay requirements.

Willingness to Enforce Reporting Pay Policies

Past complaints regarding reporting pay after shift cuts can gauge workers’ willingness to enforce them. Workers in our survey who experienced shift cuts and self-reported coverage by a

reporting pay policy were asked, “Have you ever contacted [the reporting pay policy] authority to be compensated when you were sent home from work because business was slow or some other reason decided by the employer?” (N = 118). About half replied “yes.” The proportions were high for those self-reporting being covered by a union policy (83%, N = 26) or a state/local government policy (77%, N = 40) but lower for those self-reporting an employer policy (38%, N = 40). However, all but one of the 32 workers who say they contacted the state/local government were in states without reporting pay policies. “Contacting” a reporting pay authority does not necessarily entail a formal complaint. Workers’ often have limited procedural knowledge about complaints, and past research found that a considerable fraction of complaints were not actually covered by labor regulations (Alexander and Prasad 2014). Workers’ willingness to pursue reporting pay appears non-negligible, but actionable complaints to the state about reporting pay violations appear uncommon in our sample.

Government citations could also measure reporting pay policy enforcement. Evidence for such enforcement is elusive or suggests citations are extraordinarily rare. Our correspondence with some states was either met with silence or indications that reporting pay violations are not meaningfully recorded. For example, in response to our public records request, California’s Department of Industrial Relations replied that they had no records for the numbers of reporting pay complaints. Following this request, the 2017–18 Annual Report of the California Labor Commissioner’s Office was the first such report to describe citations for violations of reporting time pay. In the 2017–18 fiscal year, California issued only three citations for violations of reporting time pay, compared to 369 citations for minimum wage violations. Massachusetts data identified general wage complaints and citations but nothing specific to reporting pay. Rhode Island similarly did not record wage violations by type but did note only two reporting pay complaints in 2019. Only one New Hampshire wage claim decision between 2014 and 2019 involved reporting pay.

We now turn to our survey experiment to answer the counterfactual question (question 4), how would workers’ responses to reporting pay violations change if they were informed of these policies? Figure 4 presents predicted probabilities of each response to the hypothetical vignettes describing reporting pay violations (N = 1,233). The predicted probabilities are from logistic regressions predicting each response. We interpret the differences in predicted probabilities between the randomly assigned treatment (N = 613) and control (N = 620) groups as the causal

effect of providing information about California’s reporting pay policy on each recommended response.¹⁰




Figure 4. Predicted probabilities of each vignette response by treatment/control group, with 95% confidence intervals (N = 1,233). Responses are ranked from enforcement (top) to exit (bottom). Notes: Predicted probabilities are from separate binary logistic regressions for each response with all control variables, described in the text.

Information about California’s reporting pay policy significantly affected the probabilities for all responses except “do nothing” in both vignettes.¹¹ In the first vignette, the treatment group was twice as likely as the control group to recommend enforcement. The modal recommendation for the treatment group was internal enforcement by informing the manager that the worker is due four hours of pay (60% probability). Recommendations for external enforcement, by reporting the issue to the state or local government, were much less probable—only 15% for the treatment group and only seven percent for the control group.¹² Positive treatment effects for enforcement coincide with negative effects for accommodation or exit. Asking the manager for a replacement shift was the most probable response (57%) for the control group, almost three times more likely than in the treatment group.

Workers who self-identified reporting pay coverage partly drive enforcement recommendations in the control group. Over half of the control group recommending external enforcement in the first vignette said they were covered by a reporting pay policy (36%) and or were at least unsure (21%). Respondents could also recommend enforcement without inferring policy coverage, consistent with prior evidence that many complaints are not actually covered by labor policies (Alexander and Prasad 2014).

The pattern of treatment effects is similar for the second shift cut vignette. Again, asking the manager for a replacement shift is the most probable response for the control group while internal enforcement is the most probable response for the treatment group. Information about the reporting pay policy significantly encouraged recommendations for both internal and external enforcement in the second vignette. Both the treatment and control groups recommended external enforcement recommendations more commonly in the second vignette than the first, suggesting that workers progress to external enforcement for unresolved repeated violations.¹³

Recommendations to look for another job also increased between vignettes. In the treatment group, external enforcement and exit were similarly probable. However, the control group was much more likely to recommend looking for another job over external enforcement. Recommendations to do nothing were lower for both groups in the second vignette compared to the first. When shift cuts were presented as repeated, many people in the control group shifted toward exit and away from external enforcement or doing nothing. However, the treatment group shifted toward external enforcement instead.

Appendix D further describes respondents' combinations of responses and progressions between vignettes. Most respondents picked only one response in each vignette. Among those selecting multiple responses, recommendations for external and internal enforcement often overlapped. Enforcement generally did not overlap with accommodation or exit. Most respondents recommending enforcement in the first vignette continued to recommend enforcement in the second. However, the control group was more likely than the treatment group to move away from enforcement and toward accommodation or exit between the two vignettes. Information about the reporting pay policy seems to reduce progressions away from enforcement.

Finally, only gender consistently significantly predicted recommendations in the vignettes. Compared to men, women were less likely to recommend doing nothing and more

likely to recommend enforcement on both vignettes. Women were also more likely to recommend external enforcement in the first vignette. Stratified models revealed some heterogeneous treatment effects for more- or less-advantaged workers (i.e., by gender, race/ethnicity, union membership, food service/retail employment, and actual policy coverage). Treatment effects for both internal and external enforcement are larger for service workers than non-service workers and for non-union members than union members, suggesting information about the policies may be especially impactful for workers that need them most. Treatment effects for internal enforcement were slightly stronger for female workers than male workers, but treatment effects for external enforcement were weaker. Treatment effects were similar by race/ethnicity (White and non-White) and actual reporting pay coverage. However, workers responses may differ more substantially when reporting pay violations themselves.

In summary, we find limited evidence that workers commonly pursue reporting pay following shift cuts in our survey or through government citation counts. However, the survey experiment suggests that informing workers about reporting pay policies significantly increases recommendations that a worker experiencing violations should enforce them. Compared with the control group, the treatment group was more likely to recommend that a hypothetical worker pursue the reporting pay that she should receive for a cut shift, primarily by informing the manager that she is due reporting pay and secondarily by filing a formal complaint with the state.

DISCUSSION

Unstable and unpredictable work schedules, including last-minute shift cuts, undermine economic security and well-being for workers and their families (Henly and Lambert 2014; Morduch and Schneider 2017; Schneider and Harknett 2019) and are symptoms of broader increases in precarious work (Kalleberg 2018). These scheduling practices fall into notable gaps in federal labor regulations. Beyond being limited in scope, labor regulations in the United States require workers to enforce them from the bottom up (Alexander and Prasad 2014; Bernhardt, Spiller, and Polson 2013; Weil and Pyles 2005), ceding nearly unilateral power to employers (Fugiel and Lambert 2019).

To assess whether sub-national labor policies can effectively address last-minute shift cuts, we examined state reporting pay policies with an original survey of hourly workers in all 50 states and Washington, D.C. Consistent with surveys targeting retail and/or food service workers

in particular local labor markets (Dickson, Bruno, and Twarog 2015; Luce, Fujita, and Sipe 2012; Scott, King, and Reddy 2017; Shaddock-Hernández et al. 2018), shift cuts were common in our survey, even outside of front-line service jobs.

The results suggest only partial compliance with state reporting pay policies. Covered workers in our survey were significantly more likely than uncovered workers to say they received reporting pay, but only “sometimes.” Similar fractions of covered and uncovered workers—just under one-quarter—said they “usually or always” receive compensation for shift cuts. We also found no evidence that reporting pay policies discourage employers from cutting workers’ shifts short. Our survey is from an online non-probability sample, however. Future research could strengthen this evidence if large-scale, nationally representative surveys measure last-minute shift cuts and receipt of reporting pay.

This relatively low compliance is on par with many other labor regulations, like minimum wage rates or rest/meal breaks (Bernhardt, Spiller, and Polson 2013). Very low awareness of reporting pay policies is a major barrier for bottom-up enforcement. Although many workers covered by reporting pay policies responded that they were covered by some kind of policy (e.g., an employer or union agreement), almost none correctly identified being covered by a state/local government policy. However, many covered workers reported uncertainty about their coverage, potentially indicating latent awareness of these policies. These workers may be able to locate the relevant policy information after a suspected violation despite not explicitly knowing during the survey.

Guided by theories on dispute resolution (Albiston, Edelman, and Milligan 2014; Alexander and Prasad 2014; Hirschman 1970), we found many workers *would* recommend enforcing reporting pay policies following a hypothetical violation *if* they were aware of them, primarily with the manager directly and secondarily through formal complaints to the state. Information about the reporting pay policy also decreased recommendations to look for another job in response to shift cuts. Without this information, most workers recommended strategies of accommodation, like asking the manager for a replacement shift or trying to switch shifts with another worker. These strategies attempt to buffer the hypothetical worker from lost work and earnings but do not actually enforce the reporting pay policy.

Enforcement recommendations were more common than actual complaints for other labor violations in past research (Bernhardt, Spiller, and Polson 2013). About 60% of the

treatment group recommended either internal or external enforcement efforts when presented with shift cuts as a repeated occurrence. As noted above, respondents in this experiment do not bear the potential costs of enforcement (e.g., time, effort, bureaucratic navigation, potential retaliation). Even with information about reporting pay policies, willingness to pursue enforcement following actual violations may be much more similar to prior estimates for other labor violations (Alexander and Prasad 2014; Weil and Pyles 2005). Our experimental results still suggest information about reporting pay policies contributes to a workplace climate that supports enforcement, even if indirectly through recommendations to coworkers. Solidarity and support among coworkers is essential for disputing and preventing employers' abuses (Hodson 2001). Workers exercise voice more often in the presence of coworkers' support (Hoffmann 2006; O'Donnell 1986). At the very least, we find workers' opinions of reporting pay violations are clearly responsive to policy information, a precursor to changes in enforcement behavior. We hope these experimental results spur additional research on empowering workers to pursue bottom-up enforcement.

More recent fair workweek ordinances likely have similar limitations to reporting pay policies because they also rely on bottom-up enforcement. State labor agencies could turn to more proactive awareness and enforcement efforts. Information about reporting pay policies should be provided through additional means beyond informational sheets posted within workplaces, given that explicit awareness is very low (Alexander and Prasad 2014). In 2014, the California Department of Industrial Relations' wage theft awareness campaign used posters and radio ads to inform workers about their legal rights.¹⁴ Future awareness campaigns should include reporting pay and inform workers about the process for filing formal complaints to limit bureaucratic hurdles and empower workers to pursue internal and external enforcement.¹⁵

Partnerships with key stakeholders could also help deter violations of reporting pay and other labor laws, particularly given labor departments' budgetary and capacity limitations (Bernhardt 2012). Public interest groups, like unions, worker centers, labor research centers, law firms, and non-profits, can help contribute to improved work, health, and safety outcomes (Fine and Gordon 2010; Weil and Pyles 2005; Finnigan and Hale 2018). These partnerships help lower enforcement barriers by providing information about labor law, assist with filing complaints, and the minimize the individual risks from complaints (Weil and Pyles 2005). The FLSA previously allowed representational lawsuits on behalf of workers (Fine and Gordon 2010); enlarging civil

society's role in labor enforcement could slow the general trend toward precarious work (Kalleberg 2018). Given that reporting-pay-covered workers are disproportionately workers of color, immigrants, and in service occupations, more effective reporting pay policies could partly address related economic disparities.

Finally, future research on recently enacted “fair workweek” ordinances should examine workers' awareness and enforcement of the policies. These ordinances include an array of protections, including “predictability pay” (pay for schedule changes within 24 hours of a scheduled shift rather than after reporting for that shift), minimum advanced schedule notice, and a minimum number of hours off between shifts. Early evidence is mixed in Oregon (Loustaunau et al. 2020) and San Francisco (Ben-Ishai, Lopez Marchena, and Ziliak Michel 2016). In contrast, awareness and compliance are relatively high in Seattle, and workers' schedule predictability and well-being have improved (Haley-Lock et al. 2019). Ongoing evaluations can examine who pursues enforcement following violations and how their pursuit of enforcement might progress if violations persist.

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ENDNOTES

¹ “Reporting pay policies” refer to both state statutes (laws passed by legislatures) and state regulations

(rules passed by agencies) that require employers to pay workers for some portion of their cut shift. All reporting pay policies are enforceable by state departments of labor. States' terms include "reporting time pay" in California, "minimum daily earnings" in Connecticut, "call-in pay" in New York, "required pay" in New Hampshire, and "wages for failure to furnish shift work" in Rhode Island.

² Authors' calculations with the 2018 Current Population Survey.

³ To our knowledge, the sample contains no workers covered by municipal fair workweek ordinances in states without reporting pay policies. Our survey asked respondents for both the state and "city or place" where they do their main job. When the survey data were collected (February–June 2019), Seattle's Fair Workweek ordinance (effective 7/1/2017) was the only municipal coverage outside of states that already had reporting pay policies. The analytic sample did not contain any workers covered by Seattle's ordinance (retail or foodservice). Fair workweek ordinances in Philadelphia (effective 4/1/2020) and Chicago (effective 7/1/2020) were implemented after our data collection.

⁴ Cut shifts are more common and reporting pay is less common for service workers compared to the total sample. Among service workers (N = 316), 46% experience shift cuts sometimes or often. Among service workers experiencing shift cuts (N = 144), 61% say they never receive compensation.

⁵ Union members are statistically significantly more likely than non-members to "sometimes" receive reporting pay following shift cuts (Table B1 in Appendix B). However, state unionization rates do not predict receipt of reporting pay when added to this model. We also fit a model with three categories for policy coverage: actual state policy coverage, self-reported employer or union coverage without state coverage (59 cases), and no coverage. Usually/always receiving reporting pay after shift cuts is much more likely for those with employer or union coverage than for those with no coverage ($p < 0.001$). Differences between those covered by a state policy and uncovered workers are very similar to the main results in all additional models.

⁶ We also fit a model with three categories for policy coverage: actual state policy coverage, self-reported employer or union coverage without state coverage (125 cases), and no coverage. There was no significant difference between employer/union covered and not covered. Results for state reporting pay coverage were very similar.

⁷ We examined differences between states using models with separate indicators for each of the places with a reporting pay policy (eight states and Washington, D.C.) relative to all uncovered workers. Few state-specific estimates statistically significantly differed from the main results, and small sample sizes per state undermine the robustness of some estimates.

⁸ The coefficient for reporting pay coverage when predicting reporting pay receipt could be biased if reporting pay coverage also predicts shift cuts. However, reporting pay coverage has limited predictive power for shift cuts.

⁹ The survey asked respondents to identify the local minimum wage: less than \$7.25/hour, \$7.25 to \$8.49/hour, \$8.50 to \$9.49/hour, \$9.50 to \$11.00/hour, more than \$11.00/hour, or "don't know/not sure." Respondents may live in cities/counties with higher minimum wages than their state, potentially underestimating minimum wage accuracy.

¹⁰ The treatment and control groups selected similar numbers of respondents (mean in the first vignette = 1.40 vs 1.43; mean in the second vignette = 1.56 vs 1.69). Those who self-reported coverage by a

government reporting pay policy should be immune to information provision if awareness is the mechanism for the treatment effect. Correspondingly, we found no treatment effect on enforcement recommendations among this group (N = 73). The treatment effect is also specific to reporting pay, rather than generally priming respondents toward stronger enforcement. Assignment to the treatment group in the reporting pay vignettes did not affect responses to subsequent vignettes about underpayment for the number of hours worked in a week (working 40 hours at \$11/hour but being paid only \$400).

¹¹ We assess statistical significance using the standard error of the marginal effect, calculated with the delta method. The 95% confidence intervals may partly overlap despite statistically significant marginal effects.

¹² The probability of recommending external enforcement in the treatment group is similar to probability of recommending external enforcement in the underpayment vignette.

¹³ The probability of recommending external enforcement in the treatment group in the second shift cut vignette is substantially lower than in a similar second vignette for underpayment (46%).

¹⁴ <https://wagetheftisacrime.com/Campaign.html>

¹⁵ In California, workers must submit labor complaints by mail or in person at the labor commissioner's office. A four-page form asks for detailed information about the employer, including the "person in charge," total number of employees, legal type of employer, and dates and dollar amounts of the violations. <https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/forms/wage/english.pdf>