Does Immigration Undermine Public Support for Social Policy?
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What is This?
Does Immigration Undermine Public Support for Social Policy?

David Brady and Ryan Finnigan

Abstract
There has been great interest in the relationship between immigration and the welfare state in recent years, and particularly since Alesina and Glaeser’s (2004) influential work. Following literatures on solidarity and fractionalization, race in the U.S. welfare state, and anti-immigrant sentiments, many contend that immigration undermines public support for social policy. This study analyzes three measures of immigration and six welfare attitudes using 1996 and 2006 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data for 17 affluent democracies. Based on multi-level and two-way fixed-effects models, our results mostly fail to support the generic hypothesis that immigration undermines public support for social policy. The percent foreign born, net migration, and the 10-year change in the percent foreign born all fail to have robust significant negative effects on welfare attitudes. There is evidence that the percent foreign born significantly undermines the welfare attitude that government “should provide a job for everyone who wants one.” However, there is more robust evidence that net migration and change in percent foreign born have positive effects on welfare attitudes. We conclude that the compensation and chauvinism hypotheses provide greater potential for future research, and we critically consider other ways immigration could undermine the welfare state. Ultimately, this study demonstrates that factors other than immigration are far more important for public support of social policy.

Over the past few decades, there has been a surge in migration to rich countries. In high-income countries, the foreign-born percent of the population more than doubled from the 1970s to 2005 (World Development Indicators [WDI] 2010). As Panel A of Figure 1 shows, the percent foreign born grew substantially across affluent democracies even from 1995 to 2005.1 By 2005, about a fifth of Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada were foreign born. More strikingly, Ireland doubled from 7 to 14.8 percent foreign born and Spain quadrupled from 2.6 to 10.6 percent. Although the percent foreign born remained relatively low in countries like Finland and Japan, no affluent democracy experienced a decline in percent foreign born from 1995 to 2005. Moreover, Panel B of Figure 1 shows a significant growth in annual net migration. In 1995, net migration was less than 1 percent of the population in 8 of the 17 countries, and Ireland and Portugal had negative net migration. By 2005, only four countries were less

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immigration, ethnic heterogeneity, social policy, welfare attitudes, preferences

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than 1 percent, and Ireland and Spain experienced over 5.5 percent net migration. Thus, while rising immigration to the United States is well known, immigration also grew markedly in Europe and other affluent democracies.

Immigration is changing labor markets, reconfiguring ethnic compositions, and altering the politics of affluent democracies. Rising immigration has been linked with anti-immigrant sentiments and the ascent of extreme rightist parties. Recently, scholars and policymakers have shown great interest in immigration’s potential consequences for the welfare states of rich democracies. Many claim that immigration poses a serious challenge to generous social policies. Specifically, scholars conjecture that immigration should reduce public support for social policy
(i.e., attitudes, values, beliefs, preferences, ideology, and public opinion favoring social policy).

Of course, it is reasonable to ask whether public opinion has a causal effect on social policy (Wilensky 2002). Still, public support for social policy is salient (Brady 2009; Manza and Brooks 2012). Ideology is interesting as culture in its own right, preferences are often the micro-level mechanism in political-economic models, and cross-national differences in values have long intrigued scholars. Public support is also a manifestation of the preferences of the constituencies of beneficiaries of welfare programs (Svallfors 2007). As a result, public support is a key mechanism in the path dependency of welfare states because it defines what is normative, reinforces expectations, influences voting, constrains policymakers, and inhibits retrenchment (Brooks and Brady 1999; Brooks and Manza 2007; Fernandez and Jaime-Castillo 2012). If immigration undermines public support, it could erode the broader political bases of generous social policies.

This study investigates the effects of immigration on public support for social policy in 17 affluent democracies in 1996 and 2006. Although previous research has made valuable contributions, our study advances the literature in several ways. Our analyses examine a comprehensive set of six welfare attitudes and both stocks and flows of immigration. We incorporate European, North American, and other affluent democracies, whereas previous studies mostly examine variation within the United States, within Europe, or between Europe and the United States. Finally, we use both the 1996 and 2006 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) role of government modules to analyze differences between countries, and change over time within countries. Although a few prior studies incorporate some of these advances, this study uniquely incorporates all. Using a broader sample of countries and time points, we aim to more comprehensively and rigorously examine the relationship between immigration and public support for social policy. Ultimately, this study demonstrates that factors other than immigration are much more important to public support for social policy. At most, we conclude that the compensation and chauvinism hypotheses provide greater potential for future research.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

An extensive body of scholarship posits the generic hypothesis that immigration undermines public support for social policy (Hypothesis 1). In particular, we review literatures on solidarity and fractionalization, race and the U.S. welfare state, and anti-immigrant sentiments. We then discuss reasons for skepticism, and present the compensation (Hypothesis 2) and chauvinism hypotheses (Hypothesis 3) as alternatives.

Solidarity and Fractionalization

Welfare state scholars have long recognized that ethnic homogeneity facilitated class mobilization in the welfare state’s development (Lipset and Marks 2000; Wilensky 2002). This work argues that homogeneity is a key basis of solidarity. Ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity make class-based solidarity more difficult and undermine one’s sense of community with fellow residents. For instance, Hechter (2004) argues that increasing ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity fueled a decline in class solidarity in affluent democracies. The implication is that immigration, due to the resulting increase in heterogeneity and reduced class solidarity, should weaken a historically key basis of public support for social policy.

Purportedly, the native born lack solidarity with immigrants and have a preference for in-group members who share salient social and physical characteristics. Indeed, native-born respondents tend to rank foreigners below natives in deservingness of public assistance (Van Oorschot 2006). Experimental evidence finds that ethnic differences inhibit people’s willingness to invest in public goods (Habyarimana et al. 2007), and observational evidence associates ethnic heterogeneity (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999) and
immigration (Razin, Sadka, and Swagel 2002) with smaller governments and less public goods. Such arguments have been called the “heterogeneity/redistribution trade-off” and a “progressive’s dilemma” (Banting and Kymlicka 2006).

Recent studies suggest immigration erodes public support for social policy. Comparing 17 European countries, Mau and Burkhardt (2009) found some evidence that immigration is negatively associated with attitudes toward reducing income differences. In the United States, Fox (2004) found that a greater share of Latinos in one’s state correlates with a preference for less welfare spending. Within Sweden, Eger (2010) showed that the level of immigration in one’s region has significant negative effects on attitudes toward greater welfare spending. Indeed, Eger found immigration was the only robustly significant macro-level variable.

Within this literature, the highly influential work of Alesina and Glaeser (2004) deserves special attention. They claim that ethnic heterogeneity and fractionalization are a principal reason why the United States has a weaker welfare state than Western Europe. In contrast, Europe has more generous welfare states partly because of ethnic homogeneity. Much of the difference in ethnic heterogeneity owes to the sizable African-origin population that was historically present in the United States but not Europe. Moreover, Alesina and Glaeser contend that immigration was a defining original source of ethnic heterogeneity in the United States (p. 9); ethnic homogeneity in Europe facilitated a stronger labor movement, which generated broad support for social policy (p. 108); and increased immigration to Europe has the potential to fuel “hatred” (p. 136).

While their argument is more multifaceted, Alesina and Glaeser’s claims about ethnic heterogeneity have clear implications for the present study. Immigration is a salient source of ethnic heterogeneity, and public support for social policy reflects preferences that are a mechanism driving welfare generosity. Moreover, at several points, Alesina and Glaeser explicitly hypothesize that rising immigration will undermine public support for social policy. Specifically, they predict that increased ethnic heterogeneity due to immigration will undermine the generosity of European welfare states (p. 11). In addition, anti-immigrant rhetoric and discourses will be used as tools to dismantle redistributive policies (pp. 166, 177), and “eventually push the continent toward more American levels of redistribution” (p. 175). They highlight that the European far right is “already using the race card to oppose welfare policies” (p. 219), and they conjecture that the more moderate right will move farther right in the face of increasing ethnic heterogeneity. Ultimately, Alesina and Glaeser are one very influential part of the literature on solidarity and fractionalization, and are well-characterized by their claim that “the importance of ethnic heterogeneity cannot be overemphasized” (p. 218).2

Race in the U.S. Welfare State

Across disciplines, scholars have demonstrated the powerful effect of race and racism on the U.S. welfare state (Schram, Soss, and Fording 2003). One strand of historical studies focuses on the critical role of racial divisions in undermining class mobilization toward a generous welfare state. For example, Lipset and Marks (2000) claim that ethnicity, race, and religion were the paramount sources of identity for most U.S. workers historically, and that these identities prevented the realization of commonality and mobilization for all workers. Quadagno (1994) demonstrates how the U.S. welfare state was purposefully constructed to exclude racial minorities. Quadagno (1994:7, 10) argues that race “became embedded in the state when welfare programs were enacted,” and was the “central social dynamic” that constrained the development of more generous social policies.

Particularly relevant here, many examine how racial context and racial attitudes trigger opposition to social policy. Several studies demonstrate that residents of areas with higher percentages of African Americans are more likely to exhibit negative beliefs about welfare
For example, Fullerton and Dixon (2009) conclude that opposition to welfare is greatest in states with a high level of prejudice and a large proportion of Blacks. Gilens (1999) shows that Americans view welfare as rewarding the undeserving poor, Blacks as lazy and undeserving, and Blacks as the primary beneficiaries of welfare. Gilens demonstrates that these perceptions are reflected in and amplified by the media, which dramatically overrepresents Blacks in depictions of the poor (Misra, Moller, and Karides 2003). Reflecting stability in opinions about race and welfare, even the 1996 welfare reform did not alter Americans’ racialization of and opposition to welfare (Dyck and Huyser 2008; Soss and Schram 2007).

One conclusion of this literature is that racial antagonism and heterogeneity contributed to American exceptionalism (Lipset and Marks 2000). Purportedly, the United States has a weaker and less supported welfare state because it is more racially divided than other affluent democracies. The implication is that public support for social policy should decline as other rich democracies encounter the greater ethnic heterogeneity that results from immigration, because the public will perceive welfare programs as disproportionately benefiting immigrants (Taylor-Gooby 2005).

Anti-immigrant Sentiments

Following the increase in immigration to the formerly more ethnically homogenous Western Europe, many scholars have studied attitudes toward immigrants in these societies (Bail 2008; Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick 2002; Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Crepaz 2008). Informed by theories of ethnic threat and competition (Blaquock 1967; Blumer 1958), this literature shows that the size and increase of migrant populations worsen attitudes toward immigrants. This effect also interacts with economic conditions (Kaya and Karakoc 2012; Kunovich 2004; Quillian 1995). For example, Semyonov, Rajman, and Gorodzeisky (2006) constructed a “competitive threat” model to explain how growing foreign-born populations contributed to the significant increase in anti-foreigner sentiments in Europe in the 1990s.

This literature is clearly relevant, although it is mostly concerned with attitudes toward immigrants and not welfare. Nevertheless, there is evidence that anti-immigrant sentiments are highly correlated with the view that immigrants exploit the welfare system (Semyonov et al. 2006). The literature on race in the U.S. welfare state demonstrates that the perception that minorities disproportionately benefit from welfare programs undermines welfare attitudes. As a result, rising immigration and the ensuing anti-immigrant sentiments are likely to reduce public support for social policy.

Reasons for Skepticism

Despite mounting claims and evidence that immigration undermines public support for social policy, a smaller skeptical literature is beginning to emerge. This literature supports the null hypothesis that immigration does not undermine public support for social policy. Prior studies suggest other predictors of welfare attitudes may be more salient than immigration. Many researchers have identified institutions and individual characteristics that predict welfare attitudes (Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm 2006; Fernandez and Jaime-Castillo 2012; Mau and Burkhardt 2009; Svallfors 2007). Welfare attitudes follow an intuitive stratification profile at the micro level, reflecting a mix of ideology and interest (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Brooks and Brady 1999). Fairly consistently, older, female, unmarried, less educated, unemployed, and lower-income respondents are more supportive of social policy. Certain family structures, rurality, and religiosity undermine welfare attitudes. At the macro level, welfare attitudes are patterned across welfare state regimes (Sachweh and Olafsdottir 2010) and positively associated with welfare effort (Brooks and Manza 2007; Eger 2010). Weak labor markets boost support for social policy and growing economies undermine support.
(Blekesaune 2007; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Mau and Burkhardt 2009). Furthermore, general normative ideologies about welfare states are more important to welfare attitudes than are perceptions regarding immigration (Van Oorschot 2010). If these factors are the paramount predictors of welfare attitudes, immigration may be marginal or even insignificant.

There are also questions about the robustness of the evidence in previous studies. Although rising immigration significantly increased anti-immigrant sentiments in Europe from 1988 to 1997, Semyonov and colleagues (2006) found no effect in 2000. The sharpest rise in anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe appears to have occurred by the mid-1990s (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Semyonov et al. 2006). Because immigration actually grew more rapidly afterward, and we analyze 1996 to 2006, it is less clear whether immigration undermined welfare attitudes in recent years. Although Mau and Burkhardt (2009) initially found that immigration undermined attitudes toward reducing income differences, the effect was relatively small and became insignificant when controlling for unemployment. Moreover, they and others show that immigration has no effect on the size and generosity of the welfare state (Brady, Beckfield, and Seeleib-Kaiser 2005; Brady and Lee forthcoming; Taylor-Gooby 2005). Even in the United States, the percent of Latinos in one’s state is not robustly associated with anti-welfare attitudes or in ways consistent with previous studies on the percent of Blacks in the population (Fox 2004).

The selection of countries in previous research also raises concern. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) devote much less attention to non-European, non-U.S. affluent democracies like Japan and New Zealand, which may not fit the Europe versus United States pattern. Contrary to the framing in Alesina and Glaeser, Europe is not definitively more homogenous than the United States (Patsiurko, Campbell, and Hall 2012), and Figure 1 shows that the percent foreign born in the United States is not exceptionally high. Banting and Kymlicka (2006:27) criticize the universal framing of fractionalization effects when most of the evidence comes from sub-Saharan Africa and the United States, “two contexts that are arguably atypical.” Immigrants in affluent democracies were not historically enslaved like African Americans, and states are typically stronger than in Africa. Indeed, Crepaz (2008) argues that Europe’s growing diversity will have very different consequences because institutions and normative expectations about government are very different from those in the United States. Similarly, Fox (2012) shows there were vast differences in the politics of and public support for the incorporation of Mexican and European immigrants into welfare before and during the New Deal. Stressing the role of context, politics, and institutions for the variation between immigrant groups’ access to welfare, Fox (2012:293) concludes that “there is no universal tradeoff between diversity and redistribution.”

One further limitation of prior studies is that they are largely cross-sectional. Even in a well-specified cross-sectional model, an association between immigration and welfare attitudes could be biased by salient unobserved characteristics of countries. Countries exhibit stable differences in difficult-to-measure factors like citizenship and immigration laws and have unique histories of immigration and racial/ethnic exclusion. A longitudinal approach controlling for such stable, unobserved country characteristics could partially alleviate this problem. Furthermore, cross-sectional differences in levels of immigration are often interpreted to represent different points in the same process of increasing ethnic heterogeneity. A longitudinal approach could assess more rigorously the effects of changes in immigration on changes in public support for social policy.

Alternative Hypotheses

Beyond simply supporting the null, two additional limitations of previous research motivate us to test two alternative hypotheses. Most previous studies analyze only the effect
of the stock of immigrants and do not test the flows of immigrants (except Mau and Burkhardt 2009). Furthermore, previous studies tend to focus on one or sometimes two social policy attitudes and do not fully exploit a broader range of social policy attitudes.

The compensation hypothesis posits that immigration increases support for social policy (Hypothesis 2). Immigration increases the perception of greater unemployment and competition for jobs (Kunovich 2004), and such perceptions are linked to support for social policy (Svallfors 1997). Indeed, perceptions of immigrants as an economic risk or threat are associated with support for redistribution (Ervasti and Hjerm 2012). For example, Finseraas (2008) shows that beliefs that immigrants reduce wages or take away jobs are positively associated with support for redistribution. Burgoon, Koster, and van Egmond (2012) find that the percent foreign born in one’s occupation increases support for redistribution, partly because it increases the perception of one’s risk of unemployment or poverty. These studies suggest respondents prefer stronger welfare programs to compensate for and protect themselves from the perceived economic competition and insecurity resulting from high immigration. Although previous research concentrates on the stock of immigrants and neglects flows, flows are more likely to increase support for social policy. Flows capture the acute, sudden change of rising immigration, as opposed to the more stable stock of immigrants (Hopkins 2010). This acute change is more visible and likely heightens perceptions of instability, insecurity, and competition for employment (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Hopkins 2010). Native-born residents may view long-term immigrant residents differently than sudden influxes of short-term immigrants (DeWaard, Kim, and Raymer 2012), resulting in distinct effects of stocks and flows on support for social policy. Rather than a large immigrant stock weakening solidarity and reducing support for social policy (as in Hypothesis 1), residents may respond to sudden increases in immigrant flows with a sense of insecurity and desire for protection from the state.

The chauvinism hypothesis expects that immigration will undermine support only for social policies that are perceived to benefit immigrants (Hypothesis 3). Welfare chauvinism occurs when public support for social policy extends only to programs for co-ethnics and citizens (Kitschelt 1995; Mewes and Mau 2012; Van der Waal et al. 2010). Public support is expected to be lower for programs perceived as open to all (including immigrants) or particularly beneficial for immigrants. This hypothesis is partly based on varying public support garnered by social policies with different perceived recipients (Gilens 1999). Immigrants are considered the least “deserving” set of beneficiaries (Van Oorschot 2006), and immigration may undermine support for programs perceived to benefit them. Fox (2012) implies that immigration is more likely to undermine support for social policies that are perceived as (1) a zero-sum redistribution of finite resources from natives to immigrants, and (2) a greater threat for immigrants to attain similar standards of living as natives, and thus directly compete with them. For these reasons, anti-immigrant mobilization during the New Deal was concentrated on public employment rather than social insurance (Fox 2012). 

In summary, the literature mostly advances the generic hypothesis that immigration undermines public support for social policy (Hypothesis 1). However, an emerging literature raises questions about the evidence in prior research, which should caution against rejection of the null hypothesis. A smaller literature suggests the compensation hypothesis: immigration increases public support for social policy (Hypothesis 2). Finally, the chauvinism hypothesis implies that immigration will undermine only certain welfare attitudes (Hypothesis 3).

METHODS
We analyze the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), a cross-national set of standardized, nationally representative surveys.
We use the role of government modules from 1996 and 2006. In 2006, after listwise deletion, samples include more than 17,000 respondents across 17 rich democracies. We include all countries with ISSP data that are affluent, mature welfare states and have been democratic since at least 1978: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We include these countries because they cover a range of immigration levels, from low immigration countries like Japan to the main immigrant destinations. These democracies are also where public opinion is likely most influential for the politics of social policy. Moreover, this comprehensive set allows us to test the generalizability of hypotheses mostly based on comparisons within Europe, within the United States, or between only Europe and the United States. In sensitivity analyses, we found similar results in Europe, the United States, and among a larger and more diverse sample of 24 countries.

In a second set of analyses, we pool 1996 and 2006 ISSP data for 13 countries that fielded the survey in both years (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Portugal did not participate in the 1996 ISSP). After listwise deletion, samples include about 31,000 respondents. Results were consistent when we replicated the 2006 analyses on those 13 countries. Table A1 in the Appendix displays descriptive statistics; Tables S1 and S2 in the online supplement display sample sizes for 2006 and 1996 (http://asr.sagepub.com supplemental).

Dependent Variables

We assess six different welfare attitudes, which is more comprehensive than previous studies (e.g., many studies examine only the income measure). These multiple welfare attitudes also advantageously force respondents to think about specific social policies instead of a general sentiment about welfare, which likely has different cultural connotations cross-nationally. We concentrate on the ISSP questions, “On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government’s responsibility to . . . ” where the ISSP asks about several social policies. For each, respondents chose among ordinal categories for definitely should be, probably should be, probably should not be, and definitely should not be. We collapse these into the binary variable of should be (1) or should not be (0). In other analyses, we constructed a standardized scale of the underlying ordinal values for all six attitudes (alpha = .79; cf. Svallfors 2006). Results were consistent with the general pattern of presented results. We present results for the specific attitudes because differences between them emerge as theoretically meaningful.

The attitude we call jobs is based on the question above with the ending, “provide a job for everyone who wants one.” In 2006, 58 percent of respondents agreed. Unemployment is based on “provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed,” to which about 71 percent agreed. The attitude we call income is based on “reduce income differences between rich and poor.” In 2006, 69 percent of respondents agreed. Retirement is based on “provide a decent standard of living for the old,” to which over 95 percent agreed. Housing is based on “provide decent housing for those who can’t afford it,” with about 80 percent agreeing. Healthcare is based on “provide healthcare for the sick,” and 96 percent supported this item. Means for these attitudes are presented by country for 2006 and 1996 in Tables S1 and S2, respectively, in the online supplement.

A few qualities about the jobs attitude are worth noting, and we will return to this in the Discussion section. This attitude has the least support compared to the other attitudes, which have over two-thirds, or the vast majority, of support. In addition, it is plausible that the chauvinism hypothesis may best apply to the jobs attitude. The jobs attitude is the only one that does not identify a target or vulnerable group. The jobs attitude refers to “everyone who wants one,” whereas the others refer to the “poor,” “unemployed,” “old,” “those
who can’t afford,” and the “sick.” The lack of a target group could prompt respondents to perceive immigrants among the beneficiaries. Jobs, along with housing and healthcare, may also be considered zero-sum finite resources. Furthermore, a job might be perceived as a means of mobility that would allow immigrants to attain a similar standard of living as natives and thus compete directly with them (Fox 2012).

Below, we discuss the ISSP questions on whether the government should spend more or less on social policy. Although such measures are often used (Eger 2010; Fox 2004; Gilens 1999), we focus on the responsibility measures for three reasons. First, international scholars mainly focus on the responsibility items. Second, the spending questions ask about more and less relative to each country’s current spending, which makes them less cross-nationally comparable (Svallfors 2006). Third, spending conflates attitudes about government responsibility with perceptions of efficacy and efficiency of government programs and taxation.

Country-Level Independent Variables

Following previous research, the analyses examine measures of both immigration stocks and flows (Eger 2010; Mau and Burkhardt 2009). Immigration data are available for all 17 countries in 1995 and 2005, meaning the immigration variables are lagged one year (WDI 2010).

For stock, we include the percent foreign born of the total population. For flows, we include net migration during the year (i.e., the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants, including citizens and noncitizens) as a percent of the population. In the 2006 analysis, we also examine the 10-year change in percent foreign born. This is the percent change between 1995 and 2005. In 2006, the typical respondent resided in a country with 12.5 percent foreign born, 2.3 percent net migration, and a 50.8 percent increase in the percent foreign born from 1995 to 2005. As discussed in note 19, there is little evidence of nonlinear effects for the immigration variables. For the most part, it is unfortunately not possible to examine immigration by country of origin. For instance, although the OECD immigration database purports to supply data by country of origin, these data are mostly incomplete or missing. Nevertheless, we do discuss sensitivity analyses with one measure below.

We examine country-level controls that previous research links with welfare attitudes (see earlier discussion). Because other research shows a relationship between welfare effort and welfare attitudes, we control for social welfare expenditures as a percent of GDP (OECDa various years). Welfare attitudes vary across welfare state regimes, so we include dummies for social democratic regime and liberal regime (conservative/Christian democratic = reference). Finally, we control for the employment rate, total employees as a percent of 18 to 65 year olds (OECDb various years), because weak labor markets lead to greater support for social policy.

A country’s immigration policies, laws, and history could be associated with both immigration and welfare attitudes. We control for the institutional context of immigrant inclusion with the Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP) (2012). The MCP index measures state policies supporting immigrants’ political inclusion, citizenship rights, and representation in educational curricula and the media. The MCP was measured in 2000 and 2010, and the ISSP in 2006, so we averaged the two time points.

In analyses available upon request, we conducted a wide variety of tests for collinearity among the country-level variables. None of these analyses suggest collinearity is a problem (the highest variance inflation factor for any country-level variable is 1.86).

Individual-Level Controls

Models control for individual-level characteristics that previous research identifies as relevant (see earlier discussion). Age and age-squared are in years. Female is coded...
one. With married as the reference, dummies indicate never married, divorced, and widowed. We also control for household size and use a binary indicator for children in the household. Dummies for suburb/town and rural are relative to urban. Education uses secondary degree as the reference, with dummies for less than secondary and university or above. Labor market status is modeled with dummies for part-time employment, unemployed, not in the labor force, self-employment, and public employment (reference = private full-time). We include relative income based on country-year-specific z-scores, which allow for international and over-time comparison without currency conversion or inflation-adjustment. Finally, with no attendance as the reference, we include dummies for low religious attendance (for “less than once a year” or “about once or twice a year”) and high religious attendance (for “several times a year” or more).

In the pooled 1996 to 2006 sample for 13 countries, data availability forces us to omit marital status, household size, children in the household, rural, suburb/town, public employment, and religion. We reanalyzed the 2006 ISSP data omitting these controls and results were consistent.

Analytic Strategy

The analyses proceed in two stages. The first examines the 2006 ISSP in 17 countries. Clustering of individuals within countries and inclusion of country-level variables violates assumptions of the standard logistic regression model. In turn, we estimate multi-level logit models.14 We estimate random intercept models, which can be expressed as two equations (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). First, the log odds of holding a welfare attitude (log \( \frac{p_{ij}}{1 - p_{ij}} \)) for the \( i \)th individual in the \( j \)th country is represented by \( \eta_{ij} \) and is a function of country intercepts (\( \beta_{0j} \)), and a set of individual-level fixed effects (\( \beta_{Xij} \)):

\[
\ln \left( \frac{p_{ij}}{1 - p_{ij}} \right) = \eta_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{Xij}
\]

Second, each country intercept (\( \beta_{0j} \)) is estimated as a function of an intercept (\( \gamma_{00} \)), a set of country-level variables (\( \gamma_{Cj} \)), and an error term (\( u_{0j} \)):

\[
\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{Cj} + u_{0j}
\]

Because it is essential to keep the models parsimonious at level 2 with only 17 countries, we estimate only random intercept models and treat individual-level coefficients as fixed effects.

The second stage analyzes the pooled sample of 1996 and 2006 ISSP data across 13 countries. We employ two-way fixed-effects (FE) models, estimating logistic regression models with fixed effects for the 13 countries and for year. The log odds of holding an attitude (log \( \frac{p_{ijt}}{1 - p_{ijt}} \)) is represented by \( Y_{ijt} \) for individual \( i \), in country \( j \), and year \( t \). \( Y_{ijt} \) is a function of a constant (\( \beta_{0} \)), individual-level characteristics (\( \beta_{Xijt} \)), country-level variables (\( \beta_{Zjt} \)), country dummies (\( \beta_{Cj} \)), and a dummy for 2006 (\( \beta_{Wt} \)):

\[
\ln \left( \frac{p_{ijt}}{1 - p_{ijt}} \right) = Y_{ijt} = \beta_{0} + \beta_{Xijt} + \beta_{Zjt} + \beta_{Cj} + \beta_{Wt}
\]

The country and year dummies correct the nonindependence of observations within country and year. Country dummies control for any stable unobserved characteristics of countries with stable effects. The dummy for 2006 controls for any generic time trend constant across countries. The two-way FE models are particularly useful because of the absence of longitudinal approaches in previous research. Furthermore, any unobserved characteristics of countries that are stable from 1996 to 2006 (e.g., history) will drop out, and the two-way FE models assess effects of immigration net of such characteristics.

We examine a series of models within each stage. Our strategy is to comprehensively examine effects of immigration with a variety of reasonable model specifications, while keeping the models parsimonious in terms of country-level variables. Throughout, we include individual-level controls. First, we include one of the three immigration variables. Second, we control for social welfare expenditures with
the immigration variable. Third, we control for welfare state regimes with the immigration variable. Fourth, we control for employment rate with the immigration variable. Fifth, we control for the MCP index with the immigration variable. Finally, we examine combinations of two immigration variables at a time.

RESULTS

Descriptive Patterns for 2006

Before discussing models, we consider country-level bivariate correlations between immigration and welfare attitudes (cf. Figure 1 and Table S1 in the online supplement). For brevity, we present the welfare attitude regarding retirement. The country means in this attitude correlate best with the means in the other welfare attitudes; correlations with the immigration variables are not sensitive to outliers; and pensions are one of the largest welfare programs. Still, these patterns are similar to the other welfare attitudes.  

Consistent with the generic Hypothesis 1, the percent foreign born correlates negatively with the welfare attitude regarding retirement. The country means in this attitude correlate best with the means in the other welfare attitudes; correlations with the immigration variables are not sensitive to outliers; and pensions are one of the largest welfare programs. Still, these patterns are similar to the other welfare attitudes.  

Figure 2 also demonstrates that net migration is positively and more strongly correlated with the retirement attitude ($r = .44$, $p = .08$). This finding contradicts Hypothesis 1 and supports the compensation hypothesis (Hypothesis 2). The two countries with the highest net migration also had very high support for the belief that government has a responsibility for the old (Ireland and Spain), which partly accounts for the positive correlation. The correlation is much weaker but remains positively signed ($r = .10$, $p = .74$) omitting those two. Among countries with above average net migration, Portugal had high support and Switzerland had low support. Japan and France experienced little net migration in 2006, and a relatively low percent of their populations felt the government has a responsibility to provide for the old. Finally, these patterns are quite similar to net migration when we examine the 10-year change in percent foreign born (see Figure S1 in the online supplement). We find...
Table 1. Multi-Level Logit Models of Welfare State Attitudes on Percent Foreign Born and Individual- and Country-Level Control Variables in 17 Affluent Democracies in 2006: Odds Ratios and Z-Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jobs</th>
<th>Unemp.</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Retirement</th>
<th>Housing</th>
<th>Healthcare</th>
</tr>
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<td>.962</td>
<td>.974</td>
<td>.992</td>
<td>.965</td>
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<td>(–.760)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Foreign Born</td>
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<td>.958</td>
<td>.963</td>
<td>.968</td>
<td>.996</td>
<td>.959</td>
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<td>(–1.430)</td>
<td>(–.738)</td>
<td>(–.091)</td>
<td>(–.831)</td>
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<td>1.004</td>
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<td>1.016</td>
<td>.977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.896)</td>
<td>(1.252)</td>
<td>(.100)</td>
<td>(–.340)</td>
<td>(.283)</td>
<td>(–.334)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Foreign Born</td>
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<td>.972</td>
<td>.958*</td>
<td>.983</td>
<td>.996</td>
<td>.981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(–1.983)</td>
<td>(–.381)</td>
<td>(–.095)</td>
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<td>.756</td>
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<td>(–2.337)</td>
<td>(.271)</td>
<td>(.470)</td>
<td>(1.129)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.399**</td>
<td>.523*</td>
<td>.838</td>
<td>.617</td>
<td>1.308</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.971</td>
<td>.988</td>
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<td>.971</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.960</td>
<td>.937</td>
<td>.898**</td>
<td>.974</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(–1.531)</td>
<td>(–1.391)</td>
<td>(–2.927)</td>
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<td>Percent Foreign Born</td>
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<td>.960</td>
<td>.959</td>
<td>.970</td>
<td>.922</td>
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<td>(–.898)</td>
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<td>(–1.606)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.010</td>
<td>1.079</td>
<td>1.116</td>
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<td>(.142)</td>
<td>(.629)</td>
<td>(.999)</td>
<td>(1.735)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                              | 17,284    | 17,134    | 17,222   | 17,697     | 17,238  | 17,706     |

Note: All individual-level controls from Table S5 in the online supplement included but not shown. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).

an even stronger positive association for the change in percent foreign born \( r = .47, p = .06 \), also contrary to Hypothesis 1 and consistent with Hypothesis 2.

Multi-Level Logit Models for 2006

The multi-level logit models of welfare attitudes on individual-level controls with no country-level variables are shown in Table S5 in the online supplement. For brevity, we simply note that individual-level results are robust and consistent with previous research. Also, results for country-level variables are not sensitive to the inclusion of any specific individual-level variables. Depending on the metric and dependent variable, the largest effects among individual-level variables are for unemployment (+), self-employment (−), and income (−). Henceforth, individual-level controls are included but not shown.

Table 1 presents multi-level logit models with percent foreign born. As explained earlier, this table includes 30 models and considers each welfare attitude separately with different specifications for country-level controls. In the first row, as the only country-level variable, percent foreign born is insignificant for five of the six welfare attitudes. The exception is that percent foreign born is significantly negative for the jobs attitude. In the second set of models, we include social welfare expenditures as a country-level control, although it is insignificant. Again, percent foreign born is insignificant in five of six models and the exception is jobs.
In the third set, we control for welfare state regimes. Social democratic regime is often insignificant and surprisingly significantly negative for the income attitude. However, respondents in liberal regimes are significantly less likely to support the jobs, unemployment, and income attitudes. The percent foreign born has a significant negative association with the income and jobs attitudes. In the fourth set, the employment rate is the country-level control. The employment rate is significantly negative for the housing attitude, but insignificant for the other five. The percent foreign born is only significant for jobs. In the fifth set, including the MCP index, percent foreign born is never significant. The MCP index is also not significantly associated with any of the welfare attitudes.

Altogether, percent foreign born fails to reach significance in 25 of 30 models. The key exception is the jobs attitude, where percent foreign born has a significant negative effect in four of the five models. The largest effect occurs in the first model with no country-level controls. For a standard deviation greater percent foreign born, support for the jobs attitude is expected to be lower by a factor of 1.41. Thus, percent foreign born does not undermine welfare attitudes generally, but is negatively associated with the attitude that government has a responsibility to "provide a job for everyone who wants one."

Table 2 displays the models with net migration. Across the 36 models, net migration is more robustly significant than percent foreign born was in Table 1. Contrary to Hypothesis 1 and consistent with Hypothesis 2, net migration is always positively signed. In the first set of models, net migration is significantly positive for the retirement and housing attitudes. In the second set controlling for social welfare expenditures, net migration is significantly positive for all welfare attitudes except healthcare. In the third set, with welfare state regimes, net migration is significantly positive in four models and nearly significant for a fifth. In the fourth set, controlling for the employment rate, net migration is significantly positive for retirement and housing. In the fifth set, with the MCP index, net migration is significantly positive for unemployment, income, retirement, and housing. Also, the MCP index is significantly negative for the jobs attitude.

Thus far, net migration (significant in 17 of 30 models) is more robust than percent foreign born. In the final six models, we include both net migration and percent foreign born. Both measures are now significant in five of six models, healthcare being the exception. Throughout, net migration is positive and percent foreign born is negative. For a standard deviation increase in net migration, the odds of favoring the welfare attitude are expected to increase by factors of 1.47 to 2.93. The strongest associations are with retirement and housing. For a standard deviation in percent foreign born, the odds of favoring the welfare attitude are expected to decline by factors of 1.55 to 1.95. The strongest associations are with unemployment and retirement. The positive effects of net migration and negative effects of percent foreign born were robust in a variety of sensitivity analyses as well.

Table 3 shows models with the 10-year change in percent foreign born. Generally, these results mimic results for net migration. The change in percent foreign born is always positively signed and is significant in 23 of the first 30 models. Like net migration, the largest effects are for retirement. For a standard deviation greater change in percent foreign born, the odds of holding the retirement attitude increase by factors of 2.58 to 2.79. In the last 12 models, we include the change in percent foreign born with the other two measures of immigration. Modeled together, the change in percent foreign born is significantly positive in four of six models and percent foreign born is significantly negative only for jobs. Likely because both measure flows, net migration is only significantly positive for one of the six attitudes when included with the change in percent foreign born. However, it remains positive, and the change in percent foreign born is significantly positive in three models. In total, the change in percent foreign born is always positively signed and is significant in 30 of 42 models.

In summary, the multi-level logit models for 2006 show patterns for each immigration
measure. First, percent foreign born is typically negatively signed but mostly insignificant. The exception is that percent foreign born has a fairly robust significant negative association with the jobs attitude. Second, net migration is always positively signed and is much more robustly significant. The largest effects of net migration are for the retirement and housing attitudes. Third, change in percent foreign born has the most robustly significant effect and is always positively signed. These results mostly contradict Hypothesis 1, that immigration has a generic negative effect on welfare attitudes. Results provide more support for the compensation hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), as flows often have positive effects. Results for percent foreign born and the jobs attitude can also be interpreted to support the chauvinism hypothesis (Hypothesis 3).

**Two-Way FE Models for 1996 to 2006**

Table 4 presents two-way FE models with percent foreign born. The individual-level results are presented in Table S6 in the online supplement. As in the multi-level logit models, we
control for social welfare expenditures and the employment rate. We cannot incorporate welfare regimes with country fixed-effects because they are time invariant. Any stable characteristics of countries or generic trends over time are differenced out in these models. Also, the MCP index is not available for the 1990s.

The first set of models show that percent foreign born is significantly negative for attitudes toward jobs, income, and healthcare. However, percent foreign born is significantly positive for the attitude regarding retirement. For a standard deviation increase in percent foreign born, support for the jobs, income, and healthcare attitudes are expected to decline by factors of 1.4 to 2.0. However, with the same standard deviation increase, support for the retirement attitude is expected to increase by a factor of 1.72. In the second set, percent foreign born remains significantly negative for

### Table 3. Multi-Level Logit Models of Welfare State Attitudes on 10-Year Change in Percent Foreign Born and Individual- and Country-Level Control Variables in 17 Affluent Democracies in 2006: Odds Ratios and Z-Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jobs</th>
<th>Unemp.</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Retirement</th>
<th>Housing</th>
<th>Healthcare</th>
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<td><strong>Change in Percent Foreign Born</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.005**</td>
<td>1.007**</td>
<td>1.004*</td>
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<td>(4.418)</td>
<td>(2.864)</td>
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<td>1.008***</td>
<td>1.004*</td>
<td>1.013***</td>
<td>1.008**</td>
<td>1.004</td>
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<td>1.017</td>
<td>1.028</td>
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<td>1.007**</td>
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<td>.898</td>
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<td>(1.095)</td>
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<td>(1.469)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.528*</td>
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<td>.752</td>
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<td>(.602)</td>
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<td><strong>Change in Percent Foreign Born</strong></td>
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<td>1.003</td>
<td>1.012***</td>
<td>1.005*</td>
<td>1.003</td>
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<td>(.740)</td>
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<td>(–.541)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Change in Percent Foreign Born</strong></td>
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<td>1.007**</td>
<td>1.004*</td>
<td>1.013***</td>
<td>1.008***</td>
<td>1.004</td>
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<td>(2.720)</td>
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<td>(4.730)</td>
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<td>(1.394)</td>
<td>(1.543)</td>
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<td>1.006**</td>
<td>1.004</td>
<td>1.013***</td>
<td>1.008**</td>
<td>1.003</td>
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<td>(4.303)</td>
<td>(2.879)</td>
<td>(.793)</td>
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<td>.971</td>
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<td>.973</td>
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<td>1.003</td>
<td>1.010**</td>
<td>1.004</td>
<td>1.003</td>
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<td>1.064</td>
<td>1.249</td>
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<td>(.235)</td>
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<td>17,284</td>
<td>17,134</td>
<td>17,222</td>
<td>17,697</td>
<td>17,238</td>
<td>17,706</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: All individual-level controls from Table S5 in the online supplement included but not shown. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
jobs, income, and healthcare; significantly positive for retirement; and insignificant for the other two. In the third set, percent foreign born is significantly negative for jobs, income, and healthcare, and insignificant for the other three.

Table 5 presents two-way FE models with net migration. Consistent with the multi-level logit models, net migration is positive in most models and is never significantly negative. Indeed, net migration is significantly positive in 10 of the first 18 models. We concentrate on the final six models, where we also include percent foreign born. In these models, net migration is significantly positive for four attitudes, with the exceptions of income and unemployment. For a standard deviation increase in net migration, support for welfare attitudes increases by factors of 1.14 to 1.26, with the largest effect for healthcare and the smallest significant effect for jobs. The percent foreign born is significantly negative in three models and significantly positive in one model. For a standard deviation increase in percent foreign born, support for the jobs, income, and healthcare attitudes declines by factors of 1.5 to 2.4. However, for the same standard deviation increase, the retirement attitude is expected to increase by a factor of 1.92. The percent foreign born is also insignificant for unemployment and housing.

Like the multi-level logit models, the two-way FE models show the effects of percent foreign born are not robust. Exactly half the models fail to reject the null or contradict Hypothesis 1. There is some evidence for significant negative effects, especially for the income, jobs, and healthcare attitudes. In contrast, there is also evidence that percent foreign born has a positive effect for the retirement attitude. Net migration has a more robust positive effect, which supports Hypothesis 2 and conclusions from the multi-level logit models.

**DISCUSSION**

In the past few decades, there has been rapid growth in immigration to affluent democracies. In recent years, there has seemingly been an even more rapid growth in concern for the political consequences of immigration for the welfare state. Literatures on solidarity and fractionalization, race in the U.S. welfare state, and anti-immigrant sentiments all posit the generic hypothesis that immigration undermines public support for social policy. We subject this hypothesis to a comprehensive test with data on
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17 affluent democracies in 2006 and 13 affluent democracies in 1996 and 2006. Incorporating six welfare attitudes, three measures of immigration, and a wide variety of model specifications, the evidence mostly fails to support this generic hypothesis (Hypothesis 1). Instead, our analyses suggest that other sources of public support for social policy are more important. At most, these analyses provide some support for the compensation (Hypothesis 2) and chauvinism (Hypothesis 3) hypotheses. We discuss each hypothesis and then suggest additional directions for future research.

Results for the stock of immigration provide modest support for Hypothesis 1. Percent foreign born is significantly negative in only 23 of 66 presented models and is significantly positive in three models. Notably, percent foreign born is significantly negative more often when controlling for measures of immigration flows. As we will discuss, there is a fairly robust negative effect for the jobs attitude. Also, in the two-way FE models, percent foreign born is significantly negative for the income and healthcare attitudes. Nevertheless, percent foreign born is mostly insignificant and is significantly positive in three of the two-way FE models.

There is no evidence for Hypothesis 1 with measures of immigration flows. In 66 models for net migration and 42 models for the 10-year change in the percent foreign born, there are no significant negative effects. Indeed, the change in percent foreign born is never even negatively signed and net migration is only negatively signed (insignificantly) in two models.

Because most of the evidence fails to support Hypothesis 1, we considered three further tests. First, non-EU immigration appears to have the strongest effects on anti-immigrant sentiments in Europe (Bail 2008; Semyonov et al. 2006). Also, Mau and Burkhardt (2009) differentiate non-Western immigration within Europe. In Table S7 in the online supplement, we test for effects of immigration from developing regions. As noted earlier, data are not consistently available on immigration by country of origin. However, the OECD (2008) has a circa-2000 estimate of the percent of the over-15-year-old population born in Africa.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jobs</th>
<th>Unemp.</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Retirement</th>
<th>Housing</th>
<th>Healthcare</th>
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<td>.993</td>
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<td>1.105***</td>
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<td>(3.553)</td>
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<td>(1.676)</td>
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<td>.991</td>
<td>.983</td>
<td>.956</td>
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<td>.971</td>
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<td>(1.657)</td>
<td>(2.458)</td>
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<td>(5.230)</td>
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<td>.934***</td>
<td>.870***</td>
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<td>(–.471)</td>
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<td>(–.528)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Foreign Born</td>
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<td>.995</td>
<td>.935***</td>
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<td>.869***</td>
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<td>32,028</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Note: All individual-level controls from Table S6 in the online supplement included but not shown. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
Asia, and Latin America. Caution is warranted as the estimates are lagged six years before the ISSP, when immigration was changing rapidly in most countries. Still, Table S7 shows results quite similar to the percent foreign born results. This variable is insignificant in 30 of 42 models. Yet, the percent foreign born from developing regions has a fairly robust significant negative effect for the jobs attitude and a few other negative effects. This measure correlates strongly with the percent foreign born in 2006 ($r = .72$), and the percent foreign born is insignificant for all dependent variables with this measure included. This suggests that the percent foreign born proxies the percent foreign born from developing regions, most likely because immigrants from developing regions are mainly present in the context of high immigration. These results buttress those for percent foreign born and imply that country of origin immigration data would not fundamentally alter our conclusions. Still, as better data become available, future research should revisit the analyses—ideally, decomposing immigration by legal status, permanent/temporary residence, and country-of-origin.

Second, we explored effects of ethnic fractionalization independently and net of immigration (see Table S8 in the online supplement). Across the 30 models shown (and 18 others not shown), ethnic fractionalization fails to have a significant effect in all but one (for jobs when controlling for the change in percent foreign born). The fractionalization measure is for the year 2000, so the six-year lag could attenuate the effects. Nevertheless, effects of the immigration variables are relatively stable when controlling for fractionalization. Fractionalization principally increases by immigration or differential fertility and mortality. Therefore, this evidence fails to demonstrate that fractionalization is the key mechanism for any effects of immigration.

Third, immigration could harm organizations associated with pro-welfare attitudes. Some research includes unionization or left party affiliation as predictors of welfare attitudes, and scholars have considered far right parties as a consequence of rising immigration. If immigration affects these organizations, it could indirectly undermine public support for social policy. However, analyses summarized in Table S9 in the online supplement show no evidence that immigration significantly affects these organizational bases of support for social policy.

Taken as a whole, the evidence provides little support for the generic Hypothesis 1. Therefore, we conclude that other factors besides immigration are more salient for public support for social policy. As discussed earlier, welfare attitudes follow an intuitive stratification profile at the individual level. The literature also suggests that institutions, labor markets, and culture predict welfare attitudes. One criticism of Alesina and Glaeser (2004) is that they neglected to genuinely engage with the prior extensive welfare state literature (see Pontusson 2006; Taylor-Gooby 2005). Of course, Alesina and Glaeser have a more multifaceted argument that includes other sources of welfare generosity. A comprehensive test of how ethnic heterogeneity undermines coalitions, or their arguments about the significance of proportional representation electoral systems, are beyond the scope of the present study. Still, ethnic heterogeneity is a central part of their argument, and they hypothesize a relationship between immigration and public support for social policy. As a result, our analyses suggest that other themes in the welfare state literature continue to provide a more productive agenda for future research.

Unlike Hypothesis 1, results for immigration flows provide support for the compensation hypothesis (Hypothesis 2). There is a fair amount of insignificance here as well. Yet, net migration is significantly positive in 37 of 66 models and the change in percent foreign born is significantly positive in 30 of 42 models. Moreover, the measures of flows are never significantly negative, net migration is significantly positive in 14 of the 24 more rigorous two-way FE models, and the positive effects of flows are broadly distributed across attitudes. In the multi-level logit models, the largest effects are for retirement and housing. In the two-way FE models, net migration has even larger effects for the healthcare attitude. Comparing Japan and Spain illustrates these
results. Net migration amounted to less than one-tenth of a percent in 2005 for Japan, and Japan had the lowest level of support for the housing attitude (38 percent). By contrast, Spain had the highest level of net migration (5.8 percent) and the highest support for the housing attitude (96 percent).

The positive effects of flows are not driven by outlier countries (see note 20 and two-way FE models). Perhaps immigrants select into countries with strong support for social policy, as some suggest immigrants select into generous welfare states (Boeri et al. 2002). Yet, this seems unlikely.23 The two-way FE models control for the stable characteristics of countries, so immigrants would need to select into countries with increasing support for social policy to explain any positive relationships. Furthermore, the FE results provide even stronger evidence for the positive effects of flows. A selection effect also seems unlikely because net migration increases when an economy is performing well and unemployment is declining. Given that welfare attitudes weaken when the economy performs well, immigrants likely select into countries when public support is declining, not increasing.

Ultimately, results for immigration flows are most consistent with the compensation hypothesis (Hypothesis 2). These results support the argument that migrant flows represent acute and visible change, which heightens perceptions of competition, instability, vulnerability, and insecurity. While Hypothesis 1 expects a large stock of immigrants to weaken solidarity and reduce support for social policy, sudden increases in immigrant flows are associated with increased support for social policy. The contrast between these effects may stem from differential lengths of residence for immigrants across different countries. Large stocks of foreign-born residents tend to reflect long-term residence (DeWaard et al. 2012; DeWaard and Raymer 2012), potentially undermining support for inclusive policy among the native born. However, high flows of immigration may indicate large influxes of short-term immigrant residents (DeWaard and Raymer 2012). Rapid flows of this type may promote social policy support among the native born to compensate for their growing sense of insecurity, particularly because they do not expect such short-term immigrants will benefit substantially from public services.

The perceived competition and insecurity from migrant flows may lead to perceptions of unmet need, enhancing respondents’ desire for greater protection from the welfare state. One way to assess this is with the ISSP questions on whether the government should spend more or less on social policy. Analyses summarized in Table S10 in the online supplement show net migration is significantly positively associated with a preference for greater welfare spending on health, pensions, and unemployment.24 These results suggest that immigration does increase support for certain social policies. Of course, as perceptions of competition, instability, vulnerability, and insecurity are unobserved, further research is needed to investigate the precise mechanisms at work.

Although these results fail to provide much support for Hypothesis 1, the percent foreign born has a fairly robust significant negative effect for the attitude: “provide a job for everyone who wants one.” This finding is illustrated by comparing Portugal and New Zealand. Portugal had the third lowest percent foreign born in the sample in 2005 (7.2 percent) and the highest support for the jobs attitude (86 percent). By contrast, New Zealand had the third highest percent foreign born (20.7 percent) and the second lowest support for the jobs attitude (37 percent). This finding highlights the value of exploring meaningful variation in different social policy attitudes.25

Results for the jobs attitude can be interpreted as consistent with the chauvinism hypothesis (Hypothesis 3). According to this hypothesis, respondents are less likely to support welfare programs that benefit immigrants or everyone (inclusive of immigrants). Unlike the other attitudes, the wording of the jobs question, “everyone who wants one,” might prompt respondents to perceive immigrants among the beneficiaries. Furthermore, the chauvinism hypothesis implies programs are
less popular if they (1) entail a zero-sum redistribution of finite resources from natives to immigrants and (2) are seen as a threat, enabling immigrants to attain the same standard of living as natives and thus compete with them. Plausibly, the jobs item best entails this combination of perceived immigrant recipiency, zero-sum finite resources, and threat/competition. Of course, one can see some similarities in the healthcare and housing items. Therefore, more research is needed to understand precisely why immigration undermines the jobs attitude but not the other attitudes.

As an extension of the chauvinism hypothesis, we note that our analyses do not actually contradict the anti-immigrant sentiments literature. The evidence that rising immigration is associated with anti-immigrant sentiments appears convincing—at least prior to the mid-1990s. Instead, it is possible that rising immigration encourages both anti-immigrant sentiments and pro-welfare attitudes. There is notable symmetry between the characteristics that predict anti-immigrant sentiments and the characteristics predicting support for social policy. Individuals with low education, those with low income, and the unemployed tend to be both anti-immigrant and pro-welfare (see Tables S5 and S6 in the online supplement). It may be a mistake to presume that extreme right views on immigration and race necessarily correlate with American rightist views on social policy. This would be consistent with recent studies of extreme right parties in Europe. Expert surveys and analyses of manifests reveal that extreme right parties are actually not that far right on social policy, and extreme right voters espouse more centrist and even occasionally leftist economic views (Rovny 2013). For many respondents, it is thus possible that support for social policy implicitly presumes that programs are only for citizens and co-ethnics (Kitschelt 1995).

Beyond the points already raised, we suggest two directions for future research. First, comprehensive samples and over-time analyses are essential. The United States may be an unusual rather than exemplary case of how racial and ethnic heterogeneity shape welfare attitudes. Moreover, comparisons within Europe or between Europe and the United States might not generalize to other affluent democracies. For instance, Australia and Canada are much more ethnically heterogeneous than Japan, yet public support for social policy is considerably higher in the former than in the latter. Of course, it would be ideal to expand the cross-national sample beyond these 17 rich democracies (see note 4). A larger sample would yield more efficient estimates that could show more significant negative effects for percent foreign born. However, it is unlikely that a larger sample would reverse the more robust positive effects of flows.

Second, future research should investigate more qualified and conditional hypotheses about immigration and the welfare state. Perhaps scholars should concentrate on ethnic heterogeneity combined with economic inequality (Baldwin and Huber 2010), or racial/ethnic hierarchies operating independently of immigration. There are likely to be meaningful differences between historically involuntary immigration (e.g., slavery in the United States) and contemporary voluntary immigration. Scholars should also investigate if immigration encourages revisions to eligibility rules to discourage access for immigrants (Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012). Opponents of welfare may be more effective in politicizing immigration to undermine public support for social policy in previously ethnic homogenous countries, where immigrants have restricted access to welfare programs. Furthermore, perhaps immigration only undermines support for social policy where extreme right parties are prominently using anti-immigrant sentiment to argue against social policy. For instance, Brown (2013) shows that racialized discourse surrounding Latino immigration contributed to significantly more conservative welfare reforms in Arizona relative to California. We stress that the literature has not presented the generic Hypothesis 1 in these qualified and conditional ways. Therefore, even if these hypotheses find support, the generic Hypothesis 1 needs revision.

We conclude by encouraging scholars and commentators to be far more cautious with
bold claims about the political consequences of immigration or ethnic heterogeneity for welfare states. It is still possible that immigration has some influence on the politics of welfare states, as immigration appears to be negatively associated with the jobs attitude. Yet, there is much more evidence for the compensation and chauvinism hypotheses. Indeed, the strongest evidence is for the null hypothesis. For scholarship to move forward, these hypotheses are likely to be more fruitful than the generic hypothesis that has featured so prominently in the literature thus far.

APPENDIX

Table A1. Descriptive Statistics for 17 Affluent Democracies in 2006 (N = 17,222) and 13 Affluent Democracies 1996 to 2006 (N = 30,971)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th></th>
<th>1996 to 2006</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>.576</td>
<td>.494</td>
<td>.616</td>
<td>.486</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>.714</td>
<td>.452</td>
<td>.739</td>
<td>.439</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.687</td>
<td>.464</td>
<td>.676</td>
<td>.468</td>
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<tr>
<td>Retirement</td>
<td>.954</td>
<td>.210</td>
<td>.948</td>
<td>.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>.804</td>
<td>.397</td>
<td>.791</td>
<td>.407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>.962</td>
<td>.192</td>
<td>.950</td>
<td>.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Foreign Born</td>
<td>12.492</td>
<td>5.939</td>
<td>12.575</td>
<td>6.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Migration</td>
<td>2.302</td>
<td>1.546</td>
<td>2.230</td>
<td>1.509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Percent Foreign Born</td>
<td>50.848</td>
<td>79.347</td>
<td>21.048</td>
<td>4.863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Regime</td>
<td>.229</td>
<td>.420</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Regime</td>
<td>.424</td>
<td>.494</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Rate</td>
<td>72.218</td>
<td>4.796</td>
<td>68.933</td>
<td>8.282</td>
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<td>Multicultural Policy Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>48.843</td>
<td>16.513</td>
<td>47.396</td>
<td>16.873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age^2</td>
<td>2658.286</td>
<td>1684.269</td>
<td>2531.08</td>
<td>1690.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.520</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.517</td>
<td>.500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Never Married</td>
<td>.219</td>
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<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
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<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
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<td>Household Size</td>
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<tr>
<td>Children in Household</td>
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<td>.473</td>
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<td>Suburb/Town</td>
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<td>Less than Secondary</td>
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<td>.491</td>
<td>.433</td>
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<td>.396</td>
<td>.165</td>
<td>.371</td>
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<td>Part-Time Employment</td>
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<td>.122</td>
<td>.327</td>
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<td>Unemployed</td>
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<td>.045</td>
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<td>Not in Labor Force</td>
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<td>.475</td>
<td>.363</td>
<td>.481</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-Employed</td>
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<td>.116</td>
<td>.320</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Employment</td>
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<td>.438</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Income</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>1.004</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Religious Attendance</td>
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<td>.499</td>
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<tr>
<td>High Religious Attendance</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N’s apply to income and independent variables. N’s for the other dependent variables are the same as in Tables 1 through 6.
Acknowledgments
We thank the *ASR* editors and nine reviewers, Andy Andrews, Chris Bail, Jason Beckfield, Clem Brooks, John L. Campbell, Andy Fullerton, Ruud Koopmans, Steve Morgan, Mike Wallace, and audiences at the University of North Carolina, the University of Connecticut, the University of Pittsburgh, the WZB, and 2011 SASE meetings for suggestions.

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Notes
1. Figure 1 includes only countries present in our analyses. Trends are similar with a broader set of rich democracies or all high-income countries (WDI 2010).
2. Alesina and Glaeser (2004:180) summarize: “Europe is a continent filled with homogenous countries. . . . As a result of this homogeneity, the opponents of the welfare state have found it difficult to demonize the poor. . . . In this way, homogeneity made redistribution easier and more natural. The United States, by contrast, is a highly heterogeneous society. . . . As such, it has always been easy for the opponents of welfare to use racial and ethnic divisions to attack redistribution. . . . The recent rise of anti-immigrant politicians in Europe illustrates our claim that U.S.-Europe differences have more to do with the racial divisions than with deep cultural difference. As Europe has become more diverse, Europeans have increasingly been susceptible to exactly the same form of racist, anti-welfare demagoguery that worked so well in the United States.”
3. Fox (2012:261) explains: “Since the benefits of social insurance did not come from general tax revenues, social insurance may not have been perceived in stark zero-sum terms. With finite resources, a WPA job for an alien meant one less job for an American citizen. But including aliens in social insurance would not deny American citizens an opportunity for benefits.”
4. The ISSP had slightly different sampling strategies across countries, although all were intended to be nationally representative. For most, the sample was designed to be representative of adults of any nationality. For Australia, Canada, Japan, and Sweden, the sample was designed to be representative of adult citizens. Including a dummy for these four countries, effects of immigration were unchanged. The country-level correlation between the dummy and the percent foreign born in 2006 was only .14.
5. Among the countries with ISSP data that could have been added, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Slovenia are former state-socialist countries that only became democratic recently, have very different ideologies about social policy, and are not popular immigrant destinations (except Latvia). South Korea only recently became democratic and developed a welfare state, and has only 1.15 percent foreign born. Finally, immigration is fundamentally different in Israel and the percent foreign born is dramatically higher at 38.40 percent. If we include these countries in the 2006 analysis, results do not show a robust negative effect of immigration.
6. There is debate over whether public support for policy, or only elites’ attitudes, is relevant in the United States (Gilets 2012). However, influence is likely less concentrated in less unequal countries than the United States. Additionally, analyses using only respondents with above median income indicate comparable relationships between immigration and welfare attitudes.
7. We dichotomize these measures for three reasons. First, it is unlikely that “definitely” and “probably” have consistent meanings cross-culturally. Second, there is little meaningful variation between “probably” and “definitely should not be.” Third, the ordinal versions fail the parallel regression test in ordinal logit models. Nevertheless, we re-estimated the models for 2006 with gllamm in Stata with an ordinal logit link and with ordered logistic regression with clustered errors by country. Results were consistent.
8. As the only country-level variables for 2006, percent foreign born is negatively signed but insignificant ($z = –1.6$); net migration is positively signed but insignificant ($z = 1.8$); and change in percent foreign born is significantly positive ($z = 2.6$). With both in the same model, net migration is significantly positive ($z = 4.1$) and percent foreign born is significantly negative ($z = –3.9$). With both in the same model, percent foreign born is negative but insignificant ($z = –1.3$) and change in percent foreign born is significantly positive ($z = 2.3$).
9. Table S1 in the online supplement also reports intra-class correlation coefficients (ICC) for each measure in 2006. The variation between countries is statistically significant for each dependent variable ($p < .001$).
10. If we substitute the 10- or 20-year lagged or long-term average percent foreign born (1985, 1995, 2005), we also fail to find a robust significant effect. The present and historical percent foreign born are highly correlated.
11. We use the employment instead of unemployment rate because it is less sensitive to cross-national...
12. Analyses using three alternative measures of institutional context are substantively consistent. We tested Kymlicka and Banting’s (2006) typology of strong, moderate, or weak multicultural policies; the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) (Huddleston et al. 2011); and Castles and Miller’s (2008) immigration regime typology. MIPEX does not include New Zealand, and Castles and Miller do not explicitly classify eight countries. We chose the MCP index because it retains more information and is available for all 17 countries.

13. Unfortunately, the ISSP does not contain a consistent question identifying immigrant respondents. Tables S3 and S4 in the online supplement show results of a simulation exercise to determine if the presence of the foreign born in our samples could bias the results. This simulation shows that any positive effects of unobserved immigrants in the sample would need to be unreasonably large to bias the results. In one of the few studies identifying foreign-born respondents, Burgoon and colleagues (2012) find that being foreign born is not associated with the preference for redistribution in 17 European countries.

14. Specifically, we estimate xtlogit in Stata with adaptive quadrature and 30 integration points.

15. For example, a standardized item scale of the country means for welfare attitudes has strong reliability (alpha = .91) and correlates well with each of the six country means (r > .74). Also, countries with high means on the retirement attitude tend to have greater social welfare expenditures (r = .24), and social democratic regimes tend to be higher (r = .34) whereas liberal regimes tend to be lower (r = -.32).

16. As discussed in note 20, we conducted sensitivity analyses to ensure these results were not unduly influenced by outliers countries. In addition, the two-way FE models control for any stable unique characteristics of countries.

17. Previous research finds unemployment interacts with percent foreign born to exacerbate anti-immigrant sentiments. In models with the employment rate, percent foreign born, and their interaction, all three were insignificant for all six dependent variables.

18. This calculation multiplies the coefficient by the standard deviation of the independent variable, exponentiates, and then takes the inverse odds (–1/standardized odds).

19. We experimented with nonlinear effects. Net migration-squared was insignificant for all six attitudes. Percent foreign born squared was insignificant for four of the six but was significantly negative for housing and retirement. Yet, the main effect of percent foreign born was positive but insignificant for retirement, and positive and significant for housing. We also tested interactions of net migration and percent foreign born. The interaction was significantly negative in only one model, and the main effects are consistent with those presented in Table 2.

20. We re-estimated these six models while dropping one country at a time. In 83 of 85 models, percent foreign born is significantly negative and net migration is significantly positive. Omitting Switzerland, percent foreign born is negative but only near significant for housing (z = –1.87). Omitting Spain, net migration is positive but only near significant for jobs (z = 1.82). In 16 of 17 models for healthcare, percent foreign born and net migration remain insignificant. Omitting Japan, percent foreign born becomes significantly negative (z = –2.28).

21. Because others (e.g., Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Patsiurko et al. 2012) problematize the fractionalization indices underlying Alesina and Glaeser (2004; Alesina et al. 1999), we use Patsiurko and colleagues’ (2012) indices. In addition, Alesina and colleagues (1999) has a much greater time lag from 2006 (e.g., Australia’s estimate is from 1986, Canada and Spain are from 1991, and most others are from the mid-1990s) so would be a less useful test.

22. We intentionally omit organizational memberships as individual-level controls because welfare attitudes might cause selection into organizations. We include only individual-level controls that are likely to be exogenous to welfare attitudes.

23. Most tests in 2006 contradict selection effects. Contrary to selection, social welfare expenditures are near significantly negative, and the employment rate and welfare regimes are insignificant in models predicting net migration (N = 17). Also, we regressed net migration on the country means for the six welfare attitudes (N = 17). Contrary to selection, five of the six welfare attitudes are insignificant (except housing). Last, we regressed net migration on changes (2006 to 1996) in the six welfare attitudes (n = 13). Contrary to a selection effect on increasingly favorable attitudes, changes in the welfare attitudes are almost all insignificant.

24. Similar to the main analyses, percent foreign born is significantly negatively associated with a preference for greater spending on pensions and unemployment but is insignificant for health.

25. The jobs attitude has the lowest level of support of the six (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Less popular attitudes might be more malleable to immigration effects than attitudes for established citizenship rights (e.g., pensions and healthcare). Also, Svallfors (2006) shows that the ISSP jobs and income attitudes exhibit the largest class differences. Therefore, there could be social class differences in immigration effects. However, we tested whether immigration effects vary by education or income.
and found only weak evidence of heterogeneous effects.

26. We re-estimated all models confining the sample to Europe or only Europe and the United States. Immigration has no robust negative effect in either case.

27. To illustrate, we revisit the correlation between net migration and the retirement attitude in Figure 2. We simulated how many countries with a mean retirement attitude one standard deviation below the mean and net migration one standard deviation above the mean are needed to reverse this correlation. A significant negative correlation requires 59 such additional countries. However, no country in the sample has this profile, so we also added countries with Switzerland’s above average net migration and below average mean retirement attitude. These data would have to contain 123 Switzerland's for the correlation to reach even an insignificant –.0001 correlation.

28. We used the ISSP to estimate the percent of the sample affiliated with extreme right parties. As a country-level variable, this measure has no robust negative effect on welfare attitudes when included or interacted with net migration or percent foreign born.

References


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